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STIPULATING THE LAW
Gary Lawson*

In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, the Supreme Court decided important questions of structural constitutionalism on the assumption, shared by all of the
parties, that members of the Securities and Exchange Commission
are not removable at will by the president. Four Justices strongly
challenged the majority's willingness to accept what amounts to a
stipulation by the parties to a controlling issue of law. As a general
matter the American legal system does not allow parties to stipulate to legal conclusions, though it welcomes and encourages
stipulations to matters of fact. I argue that one ought to take
seriously the idea that stipulations of law should be as integrala part
of the adjudicative process as stipulations of fact-or, at the minimum, that the acceptance of stipulations of law rests on defensible
assumptions about the nature of adjudication as a mechanism for
resolving disputes ratherthan as a mechanism for declaring the law
or expressing public values. Objections to the wide use of legal stipulations often focus on the potential third-party effects of adjudication,
primarily (though not exclusively) through precedent. Those objections generally assume a contestable theory of precedent that
emanates from a law-declaring rather than a dispute-resolving
theory of adjudication.It is quite possiblefor a theory of precedent to
accompany a dispute-resolution model of adjudication without
raising (undue) concerns about externalitiesin accepting legal stipulations. Thus, the legal system should consider extending the degree
to which it enables parties to control the legal issues decided by
courts.
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INTRODUCTION

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board'-the
last decision announced by the Supreme Court during the October 2009
term-has been called "the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President's appointment and removal powers to reach the courts
in the last 20 years." Fourteen organizations and groups filed amicus curiae
briefs on the merits in the Supreme Court. Yet perhaps the most important
issue the case presented was not briefed by any of the parties or amici and
has nothing to do with the Constitution's rules regarding appointment and
removal of federal personnel. The deepest issue lurking in Free Enterprise
Fundconcerns the very nature of adjudication.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the petitioners challenged both the appointment and removal provisions for the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB" or "the Board"), a federal agency created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' to exercise sweeping regulatory authority over the
financial audits of publicly traded companies. Under the statute, the PCAOB
members are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "the Commission") 4 and are removable by the Commission only
for narrowly specified causes.! The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
various Appointments Clause challenges, but in a sharply split decision
held that the removal provisions for PCAOB members unduly limited the
president's power to control the administration of the laws. The five-Justice
majority maintained that the statute imposed an impermissible restriction on
presidential supervision by establishing a "double-for-cause" removal
framework, under which the PCAOB members could be removed only for
1.

130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).

2. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), modified, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). The twenty-year-old case to
which Judge Kavanaugh referred was Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).

§ 7211(e)(4)

(2006).

4.

15 U.S.C.

5.

See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

6.

Free Enter.Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162-64.
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cause by the members of the SEC who themselves are removable only for
cause by the president. Four dissenters insisted that the statute was a reasonable congressional accommodation of the twin needs for agency
independence and accountability and was consistent with long-established
precedent approving for-cause removal provisions for federal agency officials.'
In resolving these crucial questions of structural constitutionalism, the
majority and dissenting opinions fractured along a number of recognizable,
and perhaps predictable, jurisprudential divides: formalism versus functionalism,9 originalism versus non-originalism,to and precedent-as-law versus
precedent-as-side-constraint." All of these divides in Free EnterpriseFund
deserve careful attention, and I am sure that they will receive that attention
elsewhere. But in this Article, I focus on a subtler, though in the end even
more fundamental, divide that largely flew beneath the radar as the case was
litigated and decided.
The majority's holding that a double-for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional was based on the premise that the relevant statutes in fact (or,
more precisely, in law) set up a double-for-cause removal provision. Congress unambiguously meant for the PCAOB members to be subject only to
for-cause removal under the plain terms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but what
about the members of the SEC? As Justice Breyer pointed out both at oral
argumentl and in his dissent," the Securities Exchange Act imposes no express statutory restrictions on the removability of members of the SEC. 4
7.

See id. at 3151-61.

8.

See id. at 3170-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

9. Compare id. at 3146-47 (majority opinion) (beginning the opinion by declaring that the
"Constitution divided the 'powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories,
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial"' (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)) and concluding that "multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article H's vesting of the executive
power in the President"), with id. at 3167, 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing "the importance of examining how a particular provision, taken in context, is likely to function" and insisting
that "we should decide the constitutional question in light of the provision's practical functioning in
context").
10. Citations to founding-era figures: majority-13, dissent-I (not counting three citations
to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
Citations to 20th or 21st century legal scholars: majority-0, dissent-22.
Citations to non-originalist20th and 21st century legal scholars: majority-0, dissent-I 8 (021 if one counts Larry Lessig as "non-originalist").
11. The majority, following the lead of Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C. Circuit, appeared to
take its existing precedents upholding removal restrictions as limitations on what might otherwise be
a more sweeping presidential removal power derived from original meaning. The majority accepted
its precedents but reasoned around them rather than from them. The dissent, by contrast, was willing
to draw inferences from the removal precedents to extend them to new situations.
12.

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-20, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-

13.

See Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3173 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

861).
14. That is not at all surprising, as it is virtually certain that no such restrictions were meant
to exist in 1934 when the Securities Exchange Act was passed. At that time, the governing precedent
on removability of federal officers was Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which seemed to
hold broadly that the president had the constitutional power to remove at will all executive officials.
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Nonetheless, it has long been universally assumed that Commission members are removable only for cause. All of the parties in Free Enterprise Fund
proceeded on that assumption, 5 as had all of the judges in the lower court
as well as parties and courts in previous cases.'7 The five Justices in the majority in Free Enterprise Fund went along with the parties' agreed view of
the law regarding the removal of Commission members without conducting
an independent inquiry into the matter: "The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the
Humphrey's Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,' and we decide the case with that understanding."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer strongly challenged the majority's willingness to accept what amounted to stipulations by the parties
about the applicable law governing the removability of SEC commissioners:
One last question: How can the Court simply assume without deciding that
the SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only "for cause?" Unless the Commissioners themselves are in fact protected by a "for cause"
requirement, the Accounting Board statute, on the Court's own reasoning,
is not constitutionally defective. I am not aware of any other instance in
which the Court has similarly (on its own or through stipulation) created a
constitutional defect in a statute and then relied on that defect to strike a
statute down as unconstitutional.
It is certainly not obvious that the SEC Commissioners enjoy "for cause"
protection. Unlike the statutes establishing [forty-eight other agencies], the
statute that established the Commission says nothing about removal. It is
silent on the question. As far as its text is concerned, the President's au-

See Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress created the SEC at a
time when, under this Court's precedents, it would have been unconstitutional to make the Commissioners removable only for cause."). Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
with its novel constitutional validation of the "independent agency" whose head is removable by the
president only for cause, was still a year away. While Congress is under no general obligation to
conform its actions to governing Supreme Court precedent, it would make sense that Congress in
1934 would not bother trying to impose removal restrictions of doubtful constitutionality, especially
on a president of its own party. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE 283 (2008) ("[Jlust as Congress did not include any restrictions on presidential removals
when it created the [Federal Power Commission] in 1927, it also failed to include any such restrictions when it created the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission. Apparently, with one minor exception, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Myers, Congress did not believe that such restrictions were worth the effort." (footnotes
omitted)); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 610 (1984) (noting that in the aftermath of Myers,
Congress "ceas[ed] to provide removal protections in statutes creating new government agencies").
15.

See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.

16. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 680 (D.C. Cir.
2008), modified, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); id. at 686-87 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The
[Securities Exchange] Act does not expressly give to the President the power to remove a commissioner. However, for the purposes of this case, we accept appellants' assertions in their brief, that it
is commonly understood that the President may remove a commissioner only for 'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' ").
18.

130 S. Ct. at 3148-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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thority to remove the Commissioners is no different from his authority to
remove the Secretary of State or the Attorney General.

The Court then, by assumption, reads into the statute books a "for cause
removal" phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and which
Congress probably did not intend to write. And it does so in order to strike
down, not to uphold, another statute. This is not a statutory construction
that seeks to avoid a constitutional question, but its opposite.' 9
Professor Tuan Samahon made a similar point after the oral argument in
Free Enterprise Fund but before the decision was issued, asking: "Since
when can parties stipulate to different statutory language than that which
was duly enacted and the Court go along with it?"2 0
Justice Breyer and Samahon have a point. Certainly, if the members of
the SEC are removable at the will of the president, the majority's problem
with the removal provisions for PCAOB members would vanish, as there
would be only one layer of for-cause removal separating the PCAOB members from the president. Isn't it the height of judicial activism to declare a
federal statute unconstitutional based on quite possibly false assumptions
about the state of the law? Wouldn't judicial modesty counsel investigation
of the actual law concerning the removal of SEC commissioners before announcing broad constitutional rules that depend on that law? Aren't these
particularly telling questions given the straight conservative-liberal split on
the 5-4 vote, with the conservative Justices forming the seemingly "activist"
majority? Perhaps at the end of the day, after an independent inquiry, the
Court would decide that SEC commissioners are indeed removable only for
cause and proceed with its analysis, but aren't Justice Breyer and Samahon
right that such an inquiry is appropriate, if not jurisprudentially mandatory?
As it happens, they are probably right from the standpoint of established
practice but, I believe, wrong from the standpoint of sound principles of
adjudication. At a minimum, the majority's position rests on a coherent and
defensible-and in crucial respects quite modest and "restrained"-vision
of the role of courts in adjudication, though neither the majority nor any
other court has taken this vision anywhere near its logical extreme. Determination of the appropriate adjudicative principles, however, rests on highly
controversial foundational assumptions about the nature of law and the nature of courts that, if they truly underlay the majority's opinion, should have
been articulated and defended.
By accepting the parties' stipulation about the law, the Court placed itself in the narrow role of an arbitrator of disputes, resolving only those
specific questions put to it by the contending parties. Justice Breyer, by contrast, would have had the Court act first and foremost as a declarer of

19.

Id. at 3182-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

20.

Tuan Samahon, A Whopper of an Assumption in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, CON(Mar. 8, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/
a-whopper-of-an-assumption-in-free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaob.html.
CURRING OPINIONS
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objectively correct legal norms, using the dispute brought by the parties as a
vehicle for the performance of that declaratory function. Thus, the seemingly "activist" approach taken by the majority, which reached out to decide
an important constitutional question based on quite possibly false assumptions about the meaning of a statute, actually reflects a far more limited
conception of the judicial role than does the seemingly "restrained" position
championed by Justice Breyer.
This underlying controversy about the proper role of courts is familiar
and longstanding.2' Less familiar is the notion that judicial acceptance of
legal stipulations by the parties goes to its heart. Justice Breyer is correct
that standard American practice does not generally allow parties to stipulate
to legal conclusions. My contention is that it should, and Free Enterprise
Fund was therefore jurisprudentially right to take the state of the law as the
parties jointly offered it.
Part I of this Article reviews the background of and decision in Free Enterprise Fund to illustrate how the case was consistently framed by the
parties and the various judges involved to assume, without need for inquiry,
that SEC commissioners are subject only to for-cause removal. The parties,
in essence, successfully stipulated to a crucial element of the law governing
their case. Part II surveys the American legal system's ordinary practices
regarding stipulations, showing that in many respects, including most prominently stipulations about governing law, those practices do not give parties
anything close to complete control over the contours of the disputes that
they bring before courts. The focus for this discussion is the dispute culminating in U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of
America, Inc. ,22 in which all of the parties wanted the federal courts to de-

cide their case on the basis of a statute that had seemingly been repealed
decades before their dispute arose. The courts, over some strong dissents
along the way, ultimately declined to accept the parties' agreement regarding controlling law. Based on current doctrine, Justice Breyer's position in
Free Enterprise Fund was at least prima facie correct; if the majority wished
to depart from it, the majority probably should have provided some explanation for its actions.
Part III identifies the jurisprudential assumptions behind the current doctrine and practices and suggests an alternative set of assumptions that
supports more party control of litigation. At the heart of this issue lies the
definition of a legal dispute: Is the subject matter of a legal dispute the operative facts (and resulting social consequences) giving rise to litigation or a
set of propositions about which the parties disagree? The more that disputes
are defined in terms of events rather than propositions, the wider the scope
for independent conceptualization of disputes by adjudicators. A detailed
analysis of the concept of a legal dispute would require a lengthy book on
jurisprudence. In particular, any theory about the extent of appropriate party
control over the law applicable to their disputes (however defined) must ar21.

See infra Section III.A.

22.

508 U.S. 448 (1993).
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ticulate an account of precedent that conforms to that theory, since the relationship between precedent and party control of legal norms proves to be
complex and inescapable. I do not have the desire (or the ability) to spell out
a comprehensive account of precedent here, so my discussion is necessarily
incomplete. Accordingly, my aim in this Article is more to point out the
implications of various positions than to advance those positions. The Article concludes by considering some possible consequences of adopting a
party-centered view of adjudication of legal propositions, including some
consequences relevant to legal academics who participate as amicus curiae
in litigation.
I. LAWS BY AGREEMENT

A. The Pregame Show
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in the wake of a series of
accounting scandals that rocked the financial world in the 1990s. Title I of
the Act created the PCAOB and vested it with broad authority to regulate
and oversee the audit practices of accounting firms, including the authority
to register, inspect, investigate, and sanction such firms.2 ' The members of
the PCAOB are appointed by the SEC to five-year terms2 and "may be removed by the Commission ... in accordance with section 7217(d)(3), for
good cause shown."25 Section 7217(d)(3), in turn, provides that the SEC may
censure or remove PCAOB officials upon a finding by the Commission, after a formal hearing, that a member of the PCAOB:
(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board,
or the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce
compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard
by any registered public accounting firm or any associated person thereof.26
This provision provides fewer occasions for removing a Board member than
27
is typical for federal officers subject to for-cause removals.

23.

15 U.S.C. § 7211(a), (c) (2006).

24.

Id. § 7211(e)(4)-(5).

25.

Id. § 7211(e)(6).

26.

Id. § 7217(d)(3).

27. The standard removal restriction tracks the language governing removals of members of
the Federal Trade Commission, which permits removal for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. § 41 (2000). As the majority in Free Enterprise Fund pointed out, there are
various forms of "malfeasance" that do not appear to be grounds for removal of PCAOB members:
The Act does not even give the Commission power to fire Board members for violations of
other laws that do not relate to the Act, the securities laws, or the Board's authority. The President might have less than full confidence in, say, a Board member who cheats on his taxes; but
that discovery is not listed among the grounds for removal under § 7217(d)(3).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010).
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In addition to removal authority, the SEC maintains considerable power
over the operations of the PCAOB. 2 8 Nonetheless, there are important features of the Board's work over which the SEC does not have direct
authority. Specifically, the SEC has review power over the Board's rules and
sanctions, but it has no statutory power to direct, supervise, or review the
Board's investigative and enforcement decisions. Given this authority and
the strict conditions under which Board members can be removed, it appears
as though the PCAOB was structured as a so-called "independent agency" 29
nestled within the SEC.
In September 2005, the Board issued a report"o critical of Beckstead and
Watts-an accounting firm "[sipecializing in audits of small publicly-traded
companies"' '-and commenced a formal investigation. The firm and the
Free Enterprise Fund, of which the firm is a member, then filed a complaint
challenging the authority of the PCAOB to undertake investigations on the
ground that the PCAOB was illegally constituted and therefore could perform
no executive functions. The claimed constitutional defects involved both the
appointment and removal of Board members.
The parties' challenge to the Board under the Appointments Clause 32
was multifaceted; the details of it are ancillary to this discussion and will not
be addressed further here.3 ' Beckstead and Watts and the Free Enterprise
28.

The D.C. Circuit described the SEC's power over the PCAOB as follows:

[Tihe Commission approves all Board rules, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(g), 7217(b)(2), and may abrogate, delete, or add to them, id. § 7217(b)(5). All Board sanctions are subject to plenary review
by the Commission, id. § 7217(c)(2); NASD, 431 F.3d at 804, and the Commission "may enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of a sanction imposed by the Board,"
id. § 7217(c)(3).... It also may impose limitations upon Board activities, id. § 7217(d)(2), and
relieve the Board of its enforcement authority altogether, id. § 7217(d)(1).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
29. There is no universally accepted definition of an independent agency. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 7 (5th ed. 2009). I use the term in a formal sense to describe
an agency whose head is not removable at the will of the president, without regard for empirical
facts about the congruence of agency decisions with presidential wishes. Cf Free Enter Fund, 130
S. Ct. at 3169-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (defining independent-agency status as tuming on multiple
legal and practical factors).
For the report, including Beckstead and Watts's response to it, see PuB. Co. AccouNTPCAOB Release No. 104-2005-082, INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & WATTS,
LLP (2005), available at http://pcaobus.org (follow the "Inspections" hyperlink; then follow "Firm
Inspection Reports" hyperlink; finally follow "Beckstead and Watts" hyperlink for the Sept. 28,
2005 Inspection).
BECKSTEAD AND WATTS, LLP, http://www.becksteadwatts.com/ (last visited Feb. 6,
31.
2011).
30.

ING OVERSIGHT BD.,

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
33. There were three parts to the Appointments Clause challenge: that because of the PCAOB's
degree of independence from the SEC, the PCAOB's members are principal officers who can be appointed only by the president with Senate confirmation; that even if they are inferior officers, Congress
can only vest their appointment in the president, the courts, or the "Heads of Departments," and the
SEC is not a constitutional "Department[]"; and that even if the SEC is a "Department[]," the collective
body of SEC commissioners, as opposed to an individual person such as the Commission's chairperson, cannot be a constitutional "Head[]" of a department. For more discussion of the Appointments
Clause issues in the case, including an issue not addressed by the Court but that I think was dispositive,
32.

May 2011]1
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Fund also objected to the statute's double-for-cause removal arrangementunder which the president could remove SEC commissioners only for cause
and SEC commissioners could remove PCAOB members only for causeon the ground that it unconstitutionally insulated PCAOB members from
presidential control. Obviously, a crucial predicate of this latter argument
was the proposition that SEC commissioners can be removed only for cause.
The complaint4 treated that proposition as settled law needing no argument
or explanation. The government sought summary judgment on all claims
without contesting the assertion that SEC commissioners were removable
only for cause. In March 2007, District Judge James Robertson granted the
government's motion for summary judgment in a brief opinion that took as
given, without discussion, that "SEC commissioners can be removed by the
President for cause."35
B. Shaping the Playing Field

A year and a half later, in a not-nearly-so-brief split decision, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of the constitutional challenges to the Board's
composition and operation. The court upheld the double-for-cause removal
arrangement as consistent with governing Supreme Court precedent, especially given the availability of practical methods of presidential influence
over the SEC and the Board other than removal or the threat of removal.
Importantly, the D.C Circuit, like the district court, simply took for granted
that the SEC is an independent agency whose members can be removed only
for cause. No one contested that point.
Judge Kavanaugh dissented for the following reason:
[N]either the President nor a Presidential alter ego can remove the members of the PCAOB. Rather, the Board is removable only by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and only for cause. Put another way, the
PCAOB is an independent agency appointed by and removable for cause
by another independent agency.
Thus, Judge Kavanaugh, as did the majority, effectively accepted as stipulated that SEC commissioners are removable only for cause.

see Gary Lawson, The "Principal" Reason Why the PCAOB is Unconstitutional,62 VAND. L. REv. EN
BANC 73 (2009), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2009/1 1/the-principal-reason-why-the-pcaob-isunconsitutionall.
34. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), 2006 WL 316852.
35. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2007 WL 891675, at *5 (D.D.C.
Mar. 21, 2007), aff 'd, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
36. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 679-84 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), modified 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
37.

See id. at 679-80.

38.

Id. at 697 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 9 and the case was extensively
briefed by three parties (the petitioners, the solicitor general, and the
PCAOB) and fourteen amici. All of the parties and amici agreed that, under
existing law, the SEC commissioners could be removed by the president
only for cause. The petitioners' brief noted that in the case of the PCAOB,
"unlike with every other independent agency or entity executing federal law,
the President is precluded-either directly or through an 'alter ego' removable at will-from appointing or removing Board members," and it argued
that the president could enforce an order to the SEC to fire a Board member
"only if the Commissioner has a 'duty' to fire the Board member, such that
the failure to do so is a 'neglect of duty' justifying Presidential removal of
the Commissioner."4' The assumption that SEC commissioners are removable only for cause was a linchpin of the petitioners' separation-of-powers
argument against the for-cause limitation on removal of PCAOB members.
Neither the solicitor general nor the PCAOB challenged that assumption
about the removability of SEC commissioners. To the contrary, the solicitor
general's brief noted "the common understanding that 'the President may
remove [an SEC] commissioner only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office," ' "4 though the brief did observe in a footnote that
"[tlhis understanding exists even though the provision of the Exchange Act
establishing the Commission does not expressly limit the President's power
of removal."43 The PCAOB's brief similarly observed that SEC commissioners "are customarily understood to be removable only for 'inefficiency,
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' "44 All of the parties briefed the
case as though a statutory for-cause limitation on removal of SEC commissioners were a given. No amicus brief challenged that assumption, though
several amici challenged the constitutionality of those presumed for-cause
removal limitations.45
In December 2009, the Court heard oral argument in the case. Relatively
early in his argument, petitioners' counsel Mike Carvin asserted that the
SEC commissioners were not subject to plenary control by the president.46
When Justice Breyer asked why not, Mr. Carvin answered, "[B]ecause of
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009) (mem.).
40. Brief for Petitioners at 25, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130
S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130.
39.

Id. at 31.
42. Brief for the United States at 43, Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009
WL 3290435 (quoting SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988)).
41.

43.

Id. at 43 n.15 (citation omitted).

44. Brief for Respondents Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board at 31, Free Enter Fund,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3327230.
45. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter Fund,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2372919; Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits of Mountain
States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts,
LLP, Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2406377.
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861),
2009 WL 4571555.

Stipulating the Law

May 2011 ]

1201

the removal provisions, which pose very serious removal restrictions on the
President's ability to control the SEC."47 Justice Breyer pointed out that
there was in fact no statute expressly limiting the president's authority to
remove SEC commissioners,48 and Justice Scalia interjected, "I don't think
the government will think it has achieved a great victory if it comes out of
this with the proposition that the SEC is not an independent regulatory
agency. And I don't think the government is arguing that position." 49 Mr.
Carvin agreed that "[t]hey have not taken that position.",o Justice Ginsburg
thought that "everybody agrees" 5' that SEC commissioners are removable
for cause even though the statute is silent. After a bit more colloquy regarding the possibility of holding SEC commissioners to be removable at will,
Justice Scalia noted, "[tihis is not an argument that you have made anyway.
Can we go on to the arguments that you have made?"5 2
The Justices pursued this line of questioning further during Solicitor
General Kagan's argument. Chief Justice Roberts asked point-blank, "Can
the President pick up the phone and fire the SEC commissioners?," 53 to
which Kagan responded, "The President can pick up the phone and fire the
SEC commissioners for cause, however 'cause' has been defined."5 4 The
government's position on the removability of SEC commissioners was made
unmistakably clear in an extended exchange in which Kagan noted that "for
many, many decades, everybody has assumed that the SEC commissioners
are subject to the same for-cause removal provision [as FTC commissioners], and the government has not contested that in this case, nor has Mr.
Carvin.""
Thus, all of the parties at oral argument agreed that SEC commissioners
are removable only for cause, and all of the parties structured their legal
arguments around that assumption.

47.

Id. at 16.

48.

Id.

49. Id. at 17. It is an interesting commentary on the times that no one would think it a victory
for the government to have the SEC placed under presidential control. It would not be a victory for
the SEC or Congress, but it would be quite a victory for the president-if in fact the president were
committed to a formalist view of separation of powers.
50. Id. When pressed further by Justice Breyer about the source of limitations on presidential
removal of commissioners, Mr. Carvin invoked the five-year term of office granted to commissioners
and the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in United States v. Weiner, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), in which the
Court inferred a limitation on removal for members of the War Claims Commission even though the
statute was silent on the point. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 18.
51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 22.

53.

Id.at 46.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at51.
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C. The Supreme Court Speaks
On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.
The majority held that the removal provisions for PCAOB members in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act were unconstitutional (and were severable from the rest
of the statute). As noted earlier, the Court declared that "[t]he parties agree
that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey's Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office,' and we decide the case with that understanding."" Nor was that the only legal assumption made by the parties and
accepted by the Court. While several amici urged the Court to broadly reconsider its past precedents upholding various congressional restrictions on
presidential removal power," the parties did not so urge, and the Court accordingly took the validity of those precedents as stipulated.
With those assumptions about the applicable law in hand, the essence of
the majority's reasoning is encapsulated in two critical paragraphs:
[W]e have previously upheld limited restrictions on the President's removal power. In those cases, however, only one level of protected tenure
separated the President from an officer exercising executive power. It was
the President-or a subordinate he could remove at will-who decided
whether the officer's conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard.
The Act before us does something quite different. It not only protects
Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from
the President any decision on whether that good cause exists. That decision
is vested instead in other tenured officers-the Commissioners-none of
whom is subject to the President's direct control. The result is a Board that
is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible
for the Board. 9
What made this case "quite different" from previous cases in which restrictions on presidential removal were upheld was clearly the Court's view
that it was dealing with two levels of removal restrictions rather than one.
The Court's ultimate holding was based on the fundamental assumption that
the one permissible layer of removal restrictions established by precedent
56. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148-49 (2010)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. See supra note 45. Those precedents included United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483
(1886), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which both upheld certain restrictions on the
removal of inferior officers, and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which
permitted so-called "independent agencies" whose heads were removable by the president only for
cause.
58. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 ("The parties do not ask us to reexamine any of
these precedents, and we do not do so."). The parties also agreed that the members of the PCAOB
were constitutional "Officers of the United States," Id. at 3148 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. n, § 2, cl.
2), notwithstanding a statutory declaration that the PCAOB is not a government agency and its
members are not government officers, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006). The Court accepted that stipulation as well. See Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
59.

Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153.
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was used up at the Commission level, leaving no room for removal restrictions at the Board level. Accordingly, the Court found the statutorily
specified removal restrictions on Board members unconstitutional and left in
place the nonstatutorily specified (and therefore perhaps non-existent) removal restrictions on the SEC commissioners.
The Court did not undertake its own independent inquiry about the removability of SEC commissioners. Nor did the Court redetermine, as an
original matter, the permissibility of single-layer removal restrictions. Rather, the Court took both the validity of its prior precedents and the status of
SEC commissioners as given, based on the agreement among all the parties
(though not the amici with respect to the Court's precedents) on those basic
legal propositions.
As already notedW Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices, raised
strong objections to the Court's willingness to assume legal conclusions
about the removability of SEC commissioners-though, as far as I can tell,
the dissenters had no objection to the Court's willingness to accept its prior
precedents as authoritative without independently determining whether they
warranted reconsideration. The majority did not see fit to respond to those
objections.
Courts, of course, often accept, and indeed welcome, agreements
among parties about propositions relevant to their litigation. Such agreements are called stipulations. In order to gauge whether the majority or the
dissent in Free Enterprise Fund had the right approach, and to discern the
premises underlying and implications of their competing approaches, it is
necessary briefly to survey the practices of the American legal system regarding stipulations.
II. THE FORMS

AND LIMITS OF STIPULATIONS

A. Stipulating Facts

One would think that agreement among parties to litigation is generally
a good thing. If they agree enough not to litigate at all, it is win-win-win for
the parties and the heavily burdened legal system. If the parties choose to
litigate but, instead of contesting every detail of the case tooth-and-nail,
agree to narrow the dispute down to the most essential contested points, it
again seems as though that is cause for celebration all around. Much of the
time, the legal system does indeed celebrate party agreement, at least with
respect to questions of fact. Such agreement saves the parties the time and
expense of contesting the points, and it saves the court (or jury) the trouble
of resolving them. Accordingly, it is hombook law (or perhaps more literally
encyclopedia law) that "courts ordinarily look with favor on stipulations
designed to simplify, shorten, or settle litigation and save costs to the

60.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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parties, and such stipulations should be encouraged by the courts rather than
discouraged."6'
The legal system's receptivity to stipulations of fact, however, cannot be
based wholly on a cost-saving premise, because stipulations are not always
cost savers-at least not for the courts. It is quite possible that by declining
to contest certain facts, the parties push the court to decide other matters that
may be more difficult for the court to analyze. For example, it may be easier
and cheaper for a court to determine which party owns a railroad track than
to determine the legal consequences of such ownership, although both
parties may prefer a determination of the latter point.62 Consequently, it is
not always the case that party stipulations make the court's job easier.
Whether stipulations reduce decision costs for courts is something to be
determined case by case. Nonetheless, courts typically do not engage in that
kind of case-specific cost-benefit analysis before accepting party
stipulations. When factual stipulations are involved, the legal system
generally lets the parties call the shots, which in the end is less about
reducing decision costs than about a strong ideological commitment to party
control over the course of litigation.
To be sure, this commitment to party control is not absolute. To say that
courts "ordinarily look with favor on stipulations" is not to say that courts
regard themselves as legally and unconditionally bound by them. Courts
will occasionally disregard stipulations of fact that are manifestly contrary
to evidence in the record.
One obvious circumstance is where the parties attempt to stipulate to
facts in order to establish jurisdiction that does not exist. If another private
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
litigant and I wanted to invoke
63
under the State Party Clause, we could not validly stipulate that I am the
State of Arizona when it is manifestly not true. Nor could one stipulate to a
live case or controversy if one does not actually exist. 4 In California v. San
Pablo & Tulare RailroadCo.,6 the parties sought the Supreme Court's ruling on the validity of a California tax that treated real property owned by
railroads differently than real property owned by other entities. The case
was decided on stipulated facts, which one presumes included the stipulation that the tax for which the State of California was suing had not been
paid. By 1893 when the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the railroad had tendered full payment, and the State had deposited the money in a

61.

83 C.J.S. 2d Stipulations § 3, at 6 (2000).

62.

See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.

U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for original Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases
"in which a State shall be Party").

63.

64. I am assuming for the moment that all litigation, including federal question "cases,"
requires a live dispute among parties. As an original matter, that is actually an interesting question,
see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of
Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 447 (1994), but to explore the point would take us far
afield.
65.

149 U.S. 308 (1893).
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bank, which under applicable California law extinguished the obligation."
The railroad at that point owed nothing. That fact, conceded in open court
by the State's attorney general, required dismissal, notwithstanding the de67
sire of the parties to have the case heard.
In a legal world in which federal courts have constitutionally limited jurisdiction, this principle makes a great deal of sense even in the face of a
general commitment to party control. The case-deciding power of federal
courts comes from the Constitution, not from the consent of litigating parties. 5 If the court has no power to speak other than to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction, then it cannot speak in any other way, regardless of the
wishes or stipulations of the litigants.
Subsequent cases, however, have extended the jurisdictional reasoning
of San Pablo much further in finding grounds to disregard factual stipulations. The seminal case is Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Railway Co.,

decided in 1917. The railroad had filed, and the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved, a tariff providing for a one dollar per day charge for
rail cars held for loading and unloading by shippers for longer than two
days. The tariff specifically included cars owned by the shippers and kept by
the shippers on their own tracks. The railroad sued to collect such charges
from Swift & Co., which challenged the application of the tariff to private
cars on private tracks as arbitrary and as a deprivation of property without
due process. Two days after the case was heard in the state trial court, the
parties stipulated: " 'For the purpose only of reviewing the judgment of the
Common Pleas Court on defendant's demurrer to the amended petition, it is
stipulated by the parties hereto that the track on which the cars in question
were placed was the private track of Swift and Company.' "' The trial court
held in favor of the railroad, and the Ohio state appeals court and state supreme court both affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court expressly accepted the
parties' stipulation regarding ownership of the track.

66.

San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 311-12.

67.

The Court explained why it could not hear the case:

[T]he court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare,
for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as
to the thing in issue in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the
case before the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the
court in this regard.
See id. at 314. Earlier decisions were not always so fastidious about observing this norm. See Eric
Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & Hist. Rev. 41,
99-101 (2001) (describing how Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), may well have
been a fictitious dispute founded upon knowingly false stipulations).
68. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.");
Sarah Rudolph Cole, ManagerialLitigants? The Overlooked Problem of PartyAutonomy in Dispute
Resolution, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 1199, 1202 (2000).
69.

243 U.S. 281 (1917).

70.

Swift & Co., 243 U.S. at 285.
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On writ of error, the United States Supreme Court concluded that it did
not need to pass on the validity of the tariff as applied to private cars on private tracks, as had the state courts, because "the record discloses, contrary to
the statement in the stipulation, that the track in question was not a 'private
track.' "" And indeed, a license agreement in the record makes it very clear
that the track was owned by the railroad and leased to Swift & Co." Because the case was heard in the trial court on demurrer, those actual facts
regarding ownership of the track were part of the decision of the court of
common pleas; the stipulation made by the parties was solely for purposes
of appeal. The Supreme Court refused to accept the stipulation:
Ifthe stipulation is to be treated as an attempt to agree ... that what are the
facts shall be assumed not to be facts, a moot or fictitious case is presented
[citing San Pablo] .... The fact that effect was given to the stipulation by

the appellate courts of Ohio does not conclude this court."
Taking the facts as they really were,7 4 the Court had no trouble affirming
the validity of the tariff to private cars on railroad-owned track.
Unlike in San Pablo, the parties' stipulation in Swift & Co. did not create
jurisdiction that otherwise would not exist. On the assumption that the relevant track was in fact owned by the railroad, as the record indicates, Swift &
Co. could still have had its case heard by a federal court. It just would be a
much weaker case than Swift & Co. preferred. Given the principle of limited
federal court jurisdiction, there is a big difference between a case that is not
an Article III case at all and one that is "fictitious" in the sense of presenting
a live case or controversy, with real money on the line, but that is framed by
the parties in a manner that does not precisely conform to objective reality.
And if one is dealing with state courts of unlimited jurisdiction, the rationale
of San Pablo would not necessarily counsel against accepting bogus stipulations in any circumstances, while the result in Swift & Co. might do so.
Indeed, if the Court's objection in Swift & Co. was to adjudicating fictitious cases in the broadest sense of "fictitious," then stipulations should
never be accepted uncritically. Parties often stipulate to facts that neither
side knows for sure simply for reasons of convenience or economy. Indeed,
avoiding the trouble and expense of learning the truth is one of the primary
reasons for stipulations. Or parties could stipulate to facts that each side
genuinely believes are correct but that turn out, in reality, to be wrong. If the
goal is to avoid deciding "fictitious" cases always and everywhere, courts
would always need to determine for themselves every fact in the case. That
71.

Id. at 286.

72.

See id. at 286 n.1.

73. Id. at 289. The Court also cited Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), but that case had
nothing to do with stipulations; it merely affirmed the requirement of a live case or controversy for
which effective relief can be given.
74. Of course, the "fact" of ownership of the track could easily be characterized as an issue
of law rather than fact. The Court did not address this point but instead treated ownership as a stipulated fact. This merely demonstrates that the line between fact and law is functional and
conventional rather than epistemological or ontological. See infra notes 87-89.
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is obviously not what the Court meant in Swift & Co.-the normal welcoming rule for stipulations of fact remains in effect notwithstanding that
decision. The problem in Swift & Co. was that the parties' knowingly made
a transparently false stipulation. The parties clearly wanted a legal ruling on
facts different from those actually presented, and the Court was unwilling to
indulge that desire. Swift & Co. thus extended the range of circumstances in
which courts will not accept stipulations beyond the jurisdictional foundation of San Pablo to include circumstances in which it is plain on the record
that the parties both are wrong and know that they are wrong. Framed narrowly, Swift & Co. is a rule against stipulating to obvious lies."
The Court in Swift & Co. did not explain why accepting a knowingly
false stipulation to a nonjurisdictional fact is problematic. If the duty of the
court is to decide cases within its constitutional power, there is no doubt that
the "fictitious" dispute between Swift & Co. and the Hocking Valley Railway Company met that standard: Hocking was asking for money
purportedly due, and Swift did not want to pay it on federal constitutional
and statutory grounds. The federal claims were near-certain losers if the
track was owned by the railroad rather than by Swift & Co., but they were
claims nonetheless. The stipulation of private ownership of the track did not
create a federal claim where none otherwise existed, though it did
strengthen considerably that claim's viability. If Hocking was willing to
strengthen the claim of its adversary through stipulation, why should the
federal courts care? Hocking could achieve essentially the same result by
simply failing to raise certain legal or factual issues-or even by hiring an
inferior lawyer.
The rationale behind Swift & Co., and the possible unraveling of a partycentered focus on stipulations, was perhaps revealed thirty-four years later
in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.

76

The case did not involve stipulations

but rather concerned, inter alia, the weight to be given the factual findings of
hearing examiners (who today are called administrative law judges) when
courts review agency decisions. In the course of declaring that those findings deserve whatever weight their probative value warrants, the Court
observed as follows:
The direction in which the law moves is often a guide for decision of particular cases, and here it serves to confirm our conclusion. However halting
its progress, the trend in litigation is toward a rational inquiry into truth, in
which the tribunal considers everything "logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved." This Court has refused to accept assumptions
of fact which are demonstrably false, even when agreed to by the parties
[citing, inter alia, Swift & Co.]."

75. One could frame it even more narrowly to encompass only circumstances in which the
parties stipulate to an obvious lie on appeal, after the true facts were part of the decision below.

76.

340 U.S. 474 (1951).

77.

Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 497 (citations omitted).
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If the object of litigation is to find the truth, the fact that parties have
stipulated to certain propositions is evidence of their truth, but it is hardly
conclusive. Yet no one has ever believed that courts should be single-minded
truth finders without regard to the agreements of the parties. Otherwise,
courts could never accept stipulations by the parties without independent
judicial inquiry into at least their plausibility, if not their objective
correctness. Because courts routinely accept stipulations-even objectively
false stipulations, unless their falseness appears on the face of the recordparty control must, at least ordinarily, predominate over truth finding as the
driving goal of adjudication.
Even a relatively modest conceptual focus on truth finding, however,
may provide for more occasions for disregarding stipulations than would a
narrow reading of Swift & Co. limited only to obvious lies (or obvious lies
concocted by the parties exclusively for appeal). And indeed, modem cases,
both federal and state, suggest broadly that "the parties may not create a
case by stipulating to facts which do not really exist"" and that "an appellate
court should not pronounce a rule that has importance beyond the particular
litigants when the record shows the undisputed facts to be contrary to the
stipulation."7 Courts have even extended Swift & Co. to circumstances in
which stipulations are clearly false but there is no reason to think that the
parties deliberately constructed them to be false. For example, in Dillon,
Read & Co. v. United States,o the court rejected stipulated figures in a tax

calculation where "[t]he numbers to be plugged into the formulas are agreed
to, and the final figures resulting from the formulas are agreed to, but application of the formulas to the stipulated figures does not produce the
stipulated results,"' because the IRS had misapplied the formula by failing
properly to account for certain indebtedness of the taxpayer." The parties,
said the court, "are free to stipulate to whatever facts they wish, except they
may not stipulate to facts known to be fictitious""-presumably meaning
known to the court to be fictitious even if not known to the parties to be fictitious. This gives courts a potentially active role in policing the parties'
stipulations.
In general, however, if parties stipulate to facts that are not blatantly
false, the very strong presumption is that courts will accept those stipulations and treat them as nondiscretionarily binding on the legal process. If it
is not plain on the face of the record that a stipulation is false, courts will not
78. PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding the
stipulations in the case to be reasonable).
79. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Casteel, 719 P.2d 853, 854 (Or. 1986) (rejecting a
stipulation that workers' compensation payments had been made on a single claim when the record
clearly showed two separate claims).
80.

875 F.2d 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

81.

Dillon, Read, & Co., 875 F.2d at 300.

82. See Dillon, Read & Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 246, 265 n.7 (1988), vacated, 875
F.2d 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
83. Dillon, Read & Co., 875 F.2d at 300.
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actively search for reasons to reject that stipulation. By and large, courts
leave it to the parties to determine which facts are worth arguing about, even
if a predictable consequence of that practice is to have cases sometimes decided on the basis of factual assumptions that are objectively (though not
obviously or knowingly) false. Put simply, courts routinely decide "fictitious" cases simply because those are the cases that the parties want them to
decide.
B. Stipulating Law

The legal world's view of party control looks very different when we
move from propositions of fact to propositions of law. With propositions of
fact, the baseline norm (subject to the exceptions noted above) is that party
stipulations are conclusive, at least as a matter of practice if not as a matter
of strict legal command. With propositions of law, the baseline norm is that
party stipulations are ineffectual. Declarations to that effect are legion.S As
the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, "We are not bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to questions of law."" Nor will courts accept as
binding stipulations regarding legal methodology-that is, how courts
should determine applicable law. Instead, "[w]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories
advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify
and apply the proper construction of governing law."86
This sharp difference in the treatment of stipulations of fact and law is
hard to justify jurisprudentially. Under almost any plausible legal theory,
propositions of law are epistemologically equivalent to propositions of fact,
in that each kind of proposition is subject to proof and such proof always
requires principles of evidentiary admissibility, principles of evidentiary
significance, and a standard of proof." The precise principles and standards
may vary considerably between factual and legal propositions, as they can
vary among different kinds of propositions within each category, but the
formal structure for proof does not depend on the label "law" or "fact." The
distinction between fact and law drawn by our legal system is purely
84. See, e.g., Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) ("We are required to interpret federal statutes as they are written . .. and we are not bound by parties' stipulations of law. We
are not in the business of deciding cases according to hypothetical legal schemes .... ") (citations
omitted); W.W.A., Annotation, Stipulations of parties as to the law, 92 A.L.R. 663, 664 (1934) ("It
is the general rule that stipulations as to what the law is are of no validity."); 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Stipulations § 4 (2001) ("Parties to an action may not stipulate to legal conclusions to be reached by the
court, It [sic] has generally been stated that the resolution of questions of law rests upon the court,
uninfluenced by stipulations of the parties, and accordingly, virtually all jurisdictions recognize that
stipulations as to the law are invalid and ineffective.") (footnotes omitted); 83 C.J.S. Stipulations
§ 28 (2000) ("Generally, the litigants may not stipulate as to what the law is, so as to bind the
court.... Stipulations on questions of law will be disregarded, since rulings on questions of law
must rest on the judgment of the court without being influenced by stipulations tendered by the
parties or counsel . . . .") (footnotes omitted).
85.

Estate of Sanford v. Con'r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939).

86.

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991).

87.

See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859, 862-77 (1992).
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conventional.'8 Since, however, it is a convention grounded repeatedly in the
United States Constitution, 9 this Article is not the place to launch a broadbased attack on the law-fact distinction. At least for the moment, let us accept as given that the American legal system distinguishes factual from legal
propositions, treats them differently for many purposes, and specifically
treats factual stipulations (presumptively valid) differently from legal stipulations (presumptively invalid).
While American law does not let parties determine which law is
applicable to their case, what that law means, and how courts will go about
determining the answers to those first two questions, parties do have some
measure of control over the legal landscape in their litigation. Most
obviously, parties can choose to waive legal claims, including constitutional
claims, and courts will generally not address waived claims. 0 A bilateral (or
multilateral) waiver of an issue by the parties is the functional equivalent of
a stipulation regarding the law pertaining to that issue, and no one doubts
that such waivers are generally valid. In particular, every case involves the
legal question whether the court should reconsider applicable precedents,
but if the parties do not ask the court to reexamine settled precedent, the
court will normally leave well enough (or bad enough, depending on one's
view of the precedent) alone. The Court's choice in Free EnterpriseFund to
treat Perkins and Morrison as settled law based on the agreement of the
parties, without independent consideration of the appropriateness of
rethinking those precedents, is a prime example."
Within some limits, parties are also able to specify which jurisdiction's
law will govern transactions potentially subject to conflicting legal regimes;
contractual choice-of-law provisions are upheld as long as the parties have
picked a jurisdiction whose law plausibly might govern under an independent choice-of-law analysis.92 The effect of honoring these provisions is to
allow the parties to choose the applicable law even when courts might have
determined that some other law applies in the absence of the contractual
stipulation.
There are occasional decisions suggesting an even broader role for parties in stipulating law. A New York state court case in 1906 broadly
proclaimed the following: "That parties may stipulate what the law is that
88. For what I regard as the definitive refutation of either an epistemological or ontological
distinction between fact and law, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact
Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. ifi, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
"both as to Law and Fact"); id. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
90. See 16AA CHARLEs
§ 3974.1 (4th ed. 2008).

ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

91. This is not to say that courts never choose to reexamine precedents that the parties are
willing to accept, see, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 552 U.S. 1279 (2008) (directing the parties to brief
the question whether to overrule a precedent), but only that such events are relatively ram.
92. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 E3d 543, 546-47 (7th
Cir. 2009) (reversing a district court for conducting an independent choice-of-law analysis when the
parties had already agreed on the applicable forum).
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governs their dispute, as well as what the facts are from which it arises, can-,
not be doubted. And the courts should and will give as complete effect to the
former as to the latter class of stipulations."" Pursuant to this principle, the
court gave effect to a stipulation that defendant's liquor sales prior to 1905
were lawful. Combined with an independent holding that no relevant change
in the law occurred in 1905, the stipulation established the then-present lawfulness of the defendant's activities.
While the case continues to be cited for its broad language,9 it is doubtful whether that language can be taken at face value. Because the legal claim
in that case was based entirely on the effect of a 1905 enactment, there was
no reason to think that the defendant's pre-1905 conduct was remotely at
issue, so the "stipulation" was inconsequential. Prior New York cases had
expressed a much narrower rule regarding legal stipulations, limited essen95
tially to enforcing waivers and procedures agreed upon by parties, and
subsequent cases also tended to involve waivers or choice-of-law elec97
9
tions, though the broader view continues to surface."
On the whole, however, it is fair to say that parties in the United States
generally cannot control courts on legal questions by agreement. Of course,
once a legal claim is raised, parties can try to effectively stipulate to the law
applicable to resolution of that claim by virtue of the materials that they
choose to bring before the court. Courts, however, are free under current
practice to supplement the parties' presentations with their own research, to
raise issues that the parties have (through inadvertence or choice) avoided,
and even to appoint amici to argue positions that the parties do not want
considered. Indeed, as Professor Amanda Frost reminds us in an important
study of the scope and limits of party control over litigation, "some of the
Supreme Court's landmark cases were decided on grounds that were never
raised by the parties.""
The best illustration of the limits of party control over the legal materials
employed by courts under current practice-an illustration that explicitly
brings to the forefront the key jurisprudential assumptions behind that practice and its possible alternatives-is the truly remarkable saga of section 92
of the Federal Banking Code. This provision, enacted in 1916, provides (assuming its continued validity) that national banks "located and doing
business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand
93.

In re Cullinan, 113 A.D. 485, 486 (N.Y App. Div. 1906).

94. See CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW
availableat CW2d § 7.19 (Westlaw through 2010).

YORK PRACTICE,

Stipulations § 7.19, at n.12,

95.

See In re N.Y, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 98 N.Y. 447,453 (1885).

96.

See Levy v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R., 211 A.D. 503, 505-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925).

97. See Bank of N.Y v. Amoco Oil Co., 35 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Under the law of
New York, the parties may stipulate that the law of a state bearing a reasonable relation to the transaction governs their rights and duties under the transaction. N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-105(1).").
98. See, e.g., Koren-DiResta Constr. Co., v. N.Y City Sch. Constr. Auth., 740 N.Y.S.2d 56,
61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (accepting a stipulation to the time when a contractor's claim accrued).
99.

Amanda Frost, The Limits ofAdvocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 450 (2009).
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inhabitants ... may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or
other insurance company."'" The text of the law contains no language specifically saying that banks that qualify to sell insurance under the statute can
sell insurance only in the small communities in which their qualifying
branches are located. In 1984, United States National Bank of Oregon accordingly asked that it be allowed to sell insurance from its branch in the
town of Banks, Oregon' 0' to customers anywhere in the country. Trade associations of insurance agents predictably argued that the statute only
permitted sales of insurance within the small communities containing the
relevant bank branches.
The comptroller general agreed with the bank that section 92 provided
the necessary authorization for nationwide marketing of insurance. The insurance agents sued, arguing that the comptroller's interpretation of section
92 was unreasonable. The district court held in favor of the bank and the
comptroller. The court stated the issue in the case as "whether the Comptroller reasonably concluded that Section 92 . .. authorized USBO, through a
subsidiary bank insurance agency, to solicit and sell insurance to customers
located throughout the country,',102 and held that the agency's interpretation
of section 92 was reasonable under the Chevron doctrine. 0 3
The insurance agents appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Up to that point, the
lower court, the comptroller, the insurance agents, and the National Bank of
Oregon all agreed that the case was governed by and involved the proper
interpretation of section 92 of the Federal Banking Code. The D.C. Circuit,
however, was not so sure.
In 1874, Congress adopted the Revised Statutes of the United States en
masse in order to systematize and regularize the body of federal statutory
law.'04 Section 5202 of that revision listed four exclusive ways in which
national banks could incur debts or liabilities.'o In 1913, section 13 of the
Federal Reserve Act added to this list a fifth permissible form of
indebtedness for "[1]iabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal
100. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 92
(2006)). The statute also authorized such banks to "act as the broker or agent for others in making or
procuring loans on real estate located within one hundred miles of the place in which said bank may
be located." Id. (amended 1982). Whatever the objective fate of the rest of section 92 may ultimately
be, this latter provision has not survived.
101. The 1980 census figure, which controlled the litigation involving the National Bank of
Oregon, was 489. Nat'l Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 n.6 (D.D.C.
1990). Even in the 2000 census, Banks had a population of only 1,286. Banks Oregon Demographics, Hometown USA, http://banksor.htu.myareaguide.com/demographics.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2011).
102.

Clarke, 736 F. Supp. at 1163.

103. Id. at 1167-73. For background on the Chevron doctrine, see Lawson, supra note 29, at
442-573. On second thought, that is a ridiculous amount of reading, so don't bother.
104. The entire corpus of federal statutory law at that time contained 5,602 sections.
105. REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES §5202 (1875) (amended 1913) (providing
that national banks can only be indebted by notes, deposits, drafts drawn against actual deposits, and
dividend liabilities to shareholders).
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Reserve Act."'06 Section 92 showed up three years later. And thereby hangs a
tale.
On September 7, 1916, Congress passed "[an Act To amend certain
sections of the Act entitled 'Federal Reserve Act,' approved December
twenty-third, nineteen hundred and thirteen"'07 ("1916 Act"). Most of the
1916 Act made specific reference to particular sections of the 1913 Federal
Reserve Act, directing amendments to sections 11, 13, 14, 16, 24, and 25 of
the Federal Reserve Act. The only part of the 1916 Act that did not
explicitly describe itself as an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act was
the one portion containing section 92. That portion, appearing after the
amendments to sections 11 and 13 of the Federal Reserve Act, declared that
"[s]ection fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United
States is hereby amended so as to read as follows;"'o the 1916 Act then
reproduced the previous text of section 5202, added the provision that
became codified as section 92, and clarified the power of national banks to
accept drafts or bills of exchanges from other banks-all within quotation
marks. The 1916 Act then went on to specify additional targeted
amendments to sections 14, 16, 24, and 25 of the Federal Reserve Act.
While most of the 1916 Act was an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913, it certainly seems as though the provision adding section 92 was
instead an amendment to section 5202 of the Revised Statutes.
This extensive statutory cross-referencing is critical because in 1918,
Congress enacted the War Finance Corporation Act, which provided: "Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the United States
is hereby amended so as to read as follows . . . ."'' The 1918 statute listed
the five then-permissible forms of national bank indebtedness contained in
the prior statute, added a sixth permissible form of indebtedness for
"[l]iabilities incurred under the provisions of the War Finance Corporation
Act,""o but did not reproduce, reference, or otherwise include the section 92

authorization for national banks in small towns to sell insurance. Based on
the plain language and punctuation of the relevant acts, it seems apparent
that Congress, in 1918, amended section 92 out of existence. The 1916 Act
certainly seems to have made section 92 a part of section 5202 of the Revised Statutes, and section 92 therefore does not appear to have survived the
1918 War Finance Corporation Act's amendment of section 5202. The apparently inescapable conclusion is that, in 1986, when the comptroller
approved the National Bank of Oregon's application under section 92, there
simply was no section 92 under which the application could have been approved.

106.

Federal Reserve Act of 1913, § 13, 38 Stat. 264.

107.

Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752.

108.

Id. at 753.

109.

War Finance Corporation Act, ch. 45, § 20, 40 Stat. 506 (1918).

110.

Id.
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From 1916 through the events in this case, all three departments of the
national government uniformly assumed that section 92 was in force. The
comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board had continuously treated it as
valid law since 1916."' Congress purported to amend section 92 in 1982"2
and, for the period from March 6, 1987 to March 1, 1988, provided that "[a]
national bank ... may not expand its insurance agency activities pursuant to
the Act of September 7, 1916 (12 U.S.C. 92), into places where it was not
conducting such activities as of March 5, 1987."" A phalanx of courts had
taken the viability of section 92 as given for decades." 4 The sole dissenters,
it seemed, were the compilers of the United States Code who, after including the provision in the first four editions of the code, omitted it from the
1952 version and from the next six versions on the ground that it had been
repealed in 1918."'
None of the parties disputed the relevance of section 92 to the National
Bank of Oregon's application before the comptroller or in the district court.
For all practical purposes, the parties had stipulated to the statute's validity.
Indeed, when judges of the D.C. Circuit raised the apparent nonexistence of
section 92 at oral argument, counsel for the insurance agents directly conceded the applicability of section 92, stating that they "cannot advance a
substantial argument that section 92 no longer exists.""'6 When the D.C. Circuit asked for supplemental briefing, all of the parties again agreed that
section 92 was valid, governing law.' "
Notwithstanding the uniform, consistent, and repeated agreement of the
parties that their case was governed by section 92, the D.C. Circuit disagreed. After noting the general rule that courts are not bound by
stipulations of law,"' the court found this case to be "one of those occasions
where a court may properly dispose of a case on a basis not advanced by the
parties."" 9 On the merits, the court held that section 92 was in fact repealed
in 1918, even in the face of the widespread assumptions to the contrary over

111. See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F2d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
112. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 403(a), 96
Stat. 1469, 1511 (removing the authority of national banks in small communities to broker real
estate loans).
113. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 201(b)(5), 101 Stat.
552, 583.
114. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 443 n.2
(1993) (collecting cases).
115. For a brief but thorough account of the intriguing story behind this action by the compilers, see id. at 441-42 & n.1.
116.

Clarke, 955 F.2d at 741 (Silberman, J., dissenting).

117.

Id. at 733 (majority opinion).

118.

Id.

119.

Id.
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the subsequent three-quarters of a century, and that the comptroller therefore
had no authority to approve the National Bank of Oregon's activities.' 20
Judge Silberman, dissenting, would have decided the case on the parties'
assumption that section 92 was in force. He adopted the reasoning of thenJudge Scalia, who in 1983 wrote that "[t]he premise of our adversarial system
is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and
research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by
the parties before them." 2 ' Judge Silberman noted that "although the 'stipulation of law' cases . . . establish courts' power to reach nonjurisdictional issues

not raised by the parties, they do not suggest that it is always appropriate for
courts to do so,"l22 and he therefore would have held that "the Comptroller's
ruling is a reasonable interpretation of section 92, and note[d] that we do not
decide the significance of Congress' actions in 1918."l23
The battle was renewed, with significant reinforcements, on the comptroller's petition for en banc rehearing on the merits and the bank's petition
for en banc rehearing on the court's decision to reach the validity of section
92 in the first place. The petitions were denied 8-3. Judge Sentelle, who
voted with the majority in denying rehearing, wrote a statement supporting
the court's sua sponte decision to examine the pedigree of section 92, joined
by Judges Buckley and Henderson, who formed the original panel majority.
The heart of that statement bears reproduction at length:
What the dissenters in effect argue is that the parties can stipulate to the
state of underlying law; frame a law suit, assuming that stipulation; and
obtain from the court a ruling as to what the otherwise dispositive law
would be if the stipulated case were in fact the law. Indeed, that is precisely what would have occurred in this case had the panel not, sua sponte,
raised the question of the repeal of section 92.
It has long been recognized that we are "free to ignore" stipulations as to
matters of law. Thus, by declining to argue that Congress repealed the section, appellants cannot stipulate into existence a repealed statute and then
compel the Court to compliantly advise the parties what it would do if that
statute existed.

That parties have assumed and the Comptroller has enforced the repealed
statute for over seventy years seems to me irrelevant to the question. The
question is not how long the parties assumed a certain state of the law, but
whether that state of the law is merely an assumption. The passage of time,
the acquiescence of the parties, the assumptions of officials, even all taken
together cannot enact a statute. Legislation only comes into existence
120. A contemporaneous panel of the Second Circuit, also reaching the issue even though it
had not been briefed by the parties, reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Congress did not
intend in 1918 to repeal section 92. Am. Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir.
1992).
121.

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

122.

Clarke,955 F.2d at 743.

123.

Id. at 744.
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through bicameral congressional enactment and presentment to the President of the United States. No stipulation by an executive official purporting
to operate under a statute and a party affected by the official's actions can
bring that statute into existence, even for purposes of a judicial decision as
to its construction.
. . . At bottom, I do not think it within the power of the Court to render an

advisory opinion on the construction of a statute whose existence depends
on the failure of the parties to assert its invalidity.12 4
Judge Silberman, joined by Judge Williams and Judge D.H. Ginsburg,
fired back with an equally forceful statement in dissent:
As the dissenting opinion points out, the appellant trade associations,
which represent insurance agents and underwriters, deliberately refused to
argue (waived) any claim that Congress did repeal section 92. Even when
the panel ordered supplementary briefing directed to that issue five months
after argument, the appellants declined to argue that Congress repealed the
section. Since the question is not jurisdictional, we do not see how it can
be appropriate for a federal court, sua sponte, to decide it, and we fear that
the implications of what might be thought a rather expansive view of federal judicial power could be profound indeed.
Almost any case brought rests on certain uncontested legal assumptions
that may be thought to be logical antecedents to the issues in dispute. A
court is not free, however, to examine itself any of those legal assumptions
(if non-jurisdictional) just by asserting that they are "essential to the determination." Concurrence at 1078. That would mean that a lawsuit is
framed by a court's notion of the logical way to think about a legal problem, and not by the parties' controversy.
With all due respect to our concurring colleagues, we think they have the
advisory opinion point exactly backwards. ... When a court issues an opinion on an uncontested, non-jurisdictional matter of law like the one here,
it has .. . issued an advisory opinion-although to the world rather than

the parties-because the issue was not part of the case or controversy.1
In a footnote, the dissenters added:
It seems to us that the phrase "stipulates to a matter of law" is too general
to be useful in consideration of this kind of problem. We would agree, for
instance, that if both parties simply misread a Supreme Court decision in
their briefs we would not be bound to that interpretation. But that is far
removed from a party's failure to bring an analytically separate claim that
126
we thought was available. We are not free to add such a claim to a case.
124.

Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v.Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Sentelle,

J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted).
125.

Id. at 1078-79 (Silberman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

126. Id. at 1079 n.I. Judge Randolph, for his part, took issue with the entire modem practice
of providing statements in connection with denials of rehearing: "In my view, denials of rehearing
en banc are best followed by silence." Id. at 1080 (Randoph, J., writing a separate statement).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed on the merits.12127 The
unanimous Court-including once-Judge Scalia, who had argued for party
primacy in 1983 12-held that the D.C. Circuit had the power to decide for
itself the legal validity of section 92. "The contrary conclusion," it reasoned,
"would permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented, to extract
the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize as
anything but advisory." 29 As a prudential matter, the Court found no abuse
of discretion in the D.C. Circuit's consideration of the validity of section 92,
though it withheld judgment on whether the lower court had an affirmative
duty to examine the underlying law: "After giving the parties ample opportunity to address the issue, the Court of Appeals acted without any
impropriety in refusing to accept what in effect was a stipulation on a question of law." 30 Anticlimactically for purposes of this Article, the Court then
ignored the punctuation of the 1916 Act, treated section 92 as part of the
Federal Reserve Act rather than as part of section 5202, and held that the
War Finance Corporation Act (which did not purport to restate or amend the
Federal Reserve Act) did not repeal section 92.'
United States National Bank highlights and exemplifies several wellestablished propositions about the ability of courts to raise legal issues, including dispositive legal issues, sua sponte: (1) American courts are
universally regarded as having such power; (2) that power is not limited to
matters that affect the court's jurisdiction; (3) there are, however, strong currents in the law that are hostile to the exercise of such power; (4) the power
to raise issues sua sponte will not always be exercised, so that many, and
perhaps even most, waivers of legal issues by parties will be honored; and
(5) there is no articulated set of criteria for determining when such power
should or will be exercised. In recognition of point (5), Amanda Frost has
recently sought to clarify and systematize the circumstances under which
127.

U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 448 (1993).

128. To be sure, then-Justice Scalia, in deciding a case in 1992 on the basis of an inconsistency between a regulation and a statute that no party raised, wrote:
I must acknowledge that the basis for reversing the Court of Appeals on which I rely has not
been argued by the United States, here or below. The rule that points not argued will not be
considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the
vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.
Even so, there must be enough play in the joints that the Supreme Court need not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply
because the parties agree upon it-particularly when the judgment will reinforce error already
prevalent in the system.
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted). See also NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 766 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(refusing to assume, as did the majority pursuant to the agreement of the parties, that there is a constitutional right to informational privacy).
129.

U.S. Nat'I Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 447.

130.

Id. at 447-48.

131. See id. at 448-63. Given the clear language of the relevant statutes, this conclusion took
some doing-which is why the Court's discussion consumed more than fifteen pages.
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the exercise of claim-creating power is appropriate for courts; I will have
more to say about Frost's welcome and intriguing suggestions later. Other
scholars have strongly doubted the wisdom of courts raising legal issues on
their own,' even to the point of suggesting that such a practice, at least
when done without affording the parties an opportunity to address the
courts' sua sponte arguments, might violate due process.134
Before wading into that thicket, it is necessary to set out the assumptions
about adjudication, courts, and the law generally that underlay the various
positions. Much ends up turning on a single binary choice about the nature
of courts that modem law and scholarship work very hard to make seem
multivalent.
III. TAKING

STIPULATIONS SERIOUSLY

A. A Tale of Two Models

Why do courts exist? The seemingly obvious answer is to settle disputes.' People use courts when they cannot resolve their differences
without the intervention of a third party and they cannot agree on the identity of an appropriate third-party adjudicator (or for some other reason they
do not wish to arbitrate their dispute privately). The legal system has good
reasons to establish this kind of compulsory dispute-resolution machinery
that can be unilaterally invoked by a single party: it serves as a substitute for
other, more socially disruptive means of dealing with disagreement, such as
dueling-a rather prominent form of dispute resolution in times pasts and
future.' 7 The desire to channel disputes into a peaceful, if often expensive,
adjudicatory forum and away from potentially violent or disruptive forms of
self-help infuses many aspects of the legal system, such as its willingness to
adjudicate relative (i.e., better or worse) claims of property rights instead of
insisting that litigants prove their claims to be good against the entire world.
If courts exist to resolve disputes, there is no necessary reason other than
lack of jurisdiction why they should do anything other than resolve precisely
the disputes brought to them by the parties when the parties agree on the
132.

See Frost, supra note 99.

133. See Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponle
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002).
134. See Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1288-96 (2002).
135. Or at least to settle disputes that are appropriate for resolution through the particular
legal system at issue. The American legal system is not designed to settle, for example, disputes
between my kids about who gets to make first use of a new video game. But one could imagine legal
systems that handle such matters. What is considered a "legal" dispute is a function of the norms of
any particular legal system. And importantly, to say that a dispute is "legal" is to say only that dispute-resolution machinery is available to resolve it; it says nothing about the manner in which that
machinery will or must operate.
136.

Alexander Hamilton vs. Aaron Burr, New York, 1804.

137.

Malcolm Reynolds vs. Atherton Wing, Persephone, 2517.
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character of those disputes. Of course, the parties will not always agree on
the facts, the law, or even the fundamental nature of the underlying lawsuit,
and in those circumstances courts must go their own way.'18 But to the extent
that parties can agree on any features of the litigated claim, a disputeresolving court has no clear reason to disregard that agreement.
That seems most plainly true with regard to the essential subject matter
of the case. If the parties think that they are arguing about possessory rights
to a fox carcass, for example, it would be strange for a court instead (or in
addition) to decide a boundary dispute or breach of contract action between
the parties that is not specifically at issue in the case. To be sure, there is
nothing in the nature of things that precludes a legal system from setting up
"courts" as roving commissions that seek out and resolve disputes whether
or not the parties choose to bring them before courts. One can easily imagine a legal system in which any dispute, however small, immediately brings
before the court all possible disputes among those parties and not just those
disputes that arise out of the operative facts of the specific case. Indeed, one
could even imagine a legal system in which courts resolve disputes involving "parties" who simply stay at home and mind their own business, with
such parties playing absolutely no role other than receiving judgments imposed by self-empowered inquisitorial commissions." It is enough for now
to note that such a system, while conceivable, vests courts with executive
and legislative powers, and American courts are typically limited only to
"judicial Power."'40
Once we take as given that disputes are initiated only by parties rather
than by courts, it is no great leap to say that the "dispute" before the court is
not the operative set of events giving rise to the litigation but rather the specific propositions about which the parties disagree, so that the parties define
not just the gross subject matter of the suit but also the contours of both the
legal and factual claims relevant to their dispute.141 If the parties agree on a
proposition, that proposition simply is not in dispute, and it is far from obvious why a court should try to resolve it. There is nothing conceptually
138. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty To Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 129-30 (2005).
139. A clever person might even construct a normative argument for such a regime on the
ground that "sometimes the fact that a lawsuit has not resulted stems from ignorance, poverty, or
alienation rather than from satisfaction with the status quo." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91 (6th ed. 2009).
140. That is certainly tmue of the federal courts, which are granted only "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States," U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, and no other authority other than the specificallygranted power to appoint inferior officers if Congress so directs. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Nothing
prevents individual states from granting to their courts what the federal Constitution would regard as
nonjudicial power, but no state authorizes the kind of "investigatory court" described in the text.
141. Of course, if the parties agree on too much, there might be no underlying dispute to
resolve. See Martin H. Redish & Adrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-orControversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process,73 U. CHI. L. REv. 545, 548
(2006) ("There is simply no rational means of defining the terms 'case' or 'controversy' to include a
proceeding in which, from the outset, nothing is disputed and the parties are in complete agreement."). I am addressing only circumstances in which the parties agree on certain propositions while
disagreeing on enough others to generate an actual dispute.
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impossible, of course, about defining the "dispute" more broadly so that
resolving the "dispute" can involve to some extent deciding constituent parts
of the case about which the parties agree (or resolving them through different means than the parties would prefer). As was seen in Part II, that is in
fact often the American practice, especially with propositions of law. The
question is why a legal system would ever do this.
This is precisely the disagreement about the nature of lawsuits posed,
but not carefully analyzed, by Judges Sentelle and Silberman in their
statements on the denial of en banc rehearing in Independent Insurance
Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke.142 Judge Silberman noted that allowing
courts to reach legal issues not raised by the parties "would mean that a
lawsuit is framed by a court's notion of the logical way to think about a
legal problem, and not by the parties' controversy."' 43 That is descriptively
correct. The question, though, is whether the parties' "controversy"-the set
of propositions about which the parties disagree-ought exclusively to
define the range of matters decided by a court. Judge Silberman seemingly
assumed so but did not really argue the point. And his assumption is
qualified by the concession that if the parties "misread a Supreme Court
decision in their briefs we would not be bound to that interpretation."'" On
Judge Silberman's premises, why not? If the parties can invent a statute and
deem it applicable to their case, why can't they invent a Supreme Court
decision as well? A consistent, pure dispute-resolution model of
adjudication would not accept this concession.
Judge Sentelle disagreed about the appropriate scope of the controversy
to be adjudicated, essentially because he thought that allowing parties to
define entirely the terms of the case could violate Article III by yielding an
advisory opinion: "I do not think it within the power of the Court to render
an advisory opinion on the construction of a statute whose existence depends on the failure of the parties to assert its invalidity."145 The Supreme
Court made the same suggestion, worrying that to allow the parties "to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious
constitutional principles ... would be difficult to characterize as anything
but advisory."'" But these conclusory observations do not hold up under
scrutiny. As long as there are concrete legal consequences at stake in the
case, there is nothing "advisory" about a decision based on an assumed state
of affairs. In California v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad Co.,147 the railroad

owed nothing regardless of how the case was decided, so a decision by the
Court would indeed be purely advisory. At stake in Independent Insurance

142.

See supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.

143. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
144.

Id. at 1079 n.1.

145.

Id. at 1078 (Sentelle, J., concurring).

146.

U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993).

147.

149 U.S. 308 (1893).

May 2011 ]

Stipulating the Law

1221

Agents, by contrast, was the enforceability of an authorization from a government banking agency to sell insurance. A decision on the merits of
section 92 might have been "advisory" in the sense of giving possibly hypothetically grounded answers about the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation of the statute,148 but it would have had concrete legal consequences for the parties and thus would not have been "advisory" in the
underlying constitutional sense. It mattered very much who won or lost the
case.
Neither Judge Silberman nor Judge Sentelle, then, gave persuasive reasons for taking one or the other approach to defining the controversy before
the court. Judge Silberman's basic approach, however, draws considerable
strength from the conception of litigation as a publicly supplied means for
avoiding duels or their equivalent. If the parties hired a private arbitrator,
they could specify as broad or narrow a function for that arbitrator as they
wished, provided that they could agree on the scope of the case. To the extent that courts are, in essence, a form of compulsory arbitration, there
would seem to be a prima facie case for giving parties the same power, subject only to whatever constraints are imposed by the jurisdictional limits of
the relevant tribunal. Judge Silberman's intuition about the function of
courts can be grounded in the basic observation that a mechanism that exists
to resolve disagreements should not be in the business of resolving agreements that do not need resolving. The logic of this position may have
implications broader than Judge Silberman (or anyone other than the present
author) is willing to accept, but that does not affect the soundness of the
position.
As for Judge Sentelle's position: because cases decided on possibly false
legal (or factual) assumptions about nonjurisdictional matters are nonetheless cases, one must look elsewhere than his opinion for credible reasons
why a court should ever look beyond the parties' arguments for legal materials. One need not look far. If one views the raison d'etre for courts as
dispute resolution, then party control of the issues to be decided flows naturally, if not quite ineluctably, from that function. But that is not the only
viable conception of the function of courts. One might also see courts as
declarersof law instead of or in addition to resolvers of disputes.

The case for this vision of courts was classically stated by Professor
Owen Fiss. He argued that the job of courts "is not to maximize the ends of
private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution
and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them."l 49 A court intent on law declaration is presumably interested in correct law declaration-anything else would be utterly perverse. Accordingly,
148. Note that because Independent InsuranceAgents, as the district court ruled, was really a
"step two" Chevmn case, the decisive legal issue as the parties framed the case was not the objective
meaning of section 92 but rather whether the comptroller's interpretation of section 92 was within
the range of interpretations permissible under Chevron. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Clarke, 955
F.2d 731, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
149.

Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).

1222

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:1l91

a law-declaration model of adjudication counsels strongly in favor of leaving courts free to do whatever they must to get the right answers to legal
questions. If the parties fail to make the correct arguments, to invoke the
correct materials, or even to pose the right questions, courts trying to get the
law right may need to step in and guide the process themselves. As Sarah
Cravens has quite elegantly put it:
If developing law is to be considered the property of only the parties before the court, then judges should take a more reserved or passive
approach. If instead, judges serve as trustees or custodians of the law ...
then they should be under some kind of mandate to become more involved,
and ensure that the cases before them are decided on the best grounds, using the best reasoning possible.5
Just as a pure system of dispute resolution might well cede to the parties
total control over the scope and character of the issues to be resolved, a pure
system of law declaration might well dispense entirely with parties. The
function of law declaration is often hampered rather than fostered by waiting for parties to bring specific disputes into court to trigger the opportunity
for law declaration. Individual cases do not always pose the best vehicles for
exploring legal questions. If law declaration is the goal, perhaps courts
should be modeled more after administrative agencies. Such "declaration
courts," as we might call them, could initiate the equivalent of rulemakings,
either on their own or through petitions for rulemaking, and could obtain
outside input through the equivalent of notice-and-comment procedures.'
Indeed, others have noted that justiciability doctrines, which constrain the
ability of courts to engage in law declaration at any time they deem it appropriate, are grounded in an ideology of dispute resolution.152 Pleading
rules as well may be the product of viewing courts as mechanisms for dispute resolution. 53
This conflict between viewing courts as dispute resolvers or seeing them
as law declarers has consumed scholars for decades. The poster child for the
dispute-resolution model is usually Lon Fuller,'5" though it is obvious to
anyone who reads Fuller that he did not push the model to anything close to
its logical limits.' Owen Fiss comes closer to representing the opposite
150.

Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 251, 255-56 (2004).

151. Such a suggestion is not entirely farcical; some scholars have suggested the possible
value of modeling at least some features of judicial decision making after agency notice-andcomment rulemaking. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking,76 U. CHi. L. REv. 965 (2009).
152. See Pushaw, Jr., supra note 64, at 447-50 (linking justiciability doctrines to dispute
resolution and arguing that "cases" require different justiciability norms than "controversies" because in the former federal courts are meant to serve a law-declaration function).
153.
154.
(1978).

See Miller,supra note 134, at 1263.
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353

155. For an extended discussion of this point, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of
Adjudicationand the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation,75 B.U. L. REv. 1273 (1995).
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pole, insisting that deciding cases is actually incidental to the primary function of declaring (or perhaps establishing) law. Useful surveys of the
contending forces abound,' and we do not need another survey here.
Of course, the American legal system's choice among these models is
"all of the above." Our legal system adopts neither a pure law-declaration
model nor a pure dispute-resolution model but instead reflects strong elements of both models fused into a sometimes muddled and unstable whole.
As Amanda Frost aptly describes federal court judges (in terms that have
broad application to state court judges as well), "[J]udges serve a dual role:
they must resolve the concrete disputes before them, and yet under the constitutional structure and in the common law tradition they are also expected
to make accurate statements about the meaning of law that govern beyond
the parameters of the parties and their dispute."' Certainly, this is an accurate description of current legal practice. "Almost everyone today would
agree that adjudication is about articulating public norms as well as settling
private disputes . . . ."

But why charge courts with the task of articulating norms and announcing propositions of law divorced from the underlying task of dispute
resolution, so that they are articulating norms that are not in dispute? No one
thinks that arbitration is about articulating public norms; the arbitrator's job
is to decide what the parties pay him or her to decide. Why are courts different? One can certainly describe courts as "an institutional arrangement for
using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals,"'60 but it is much harder to think of good reasons why one would want
them to serve such a role. And that role is in very strong tension with the
role of courts as resolvers of disputes. What induces the legal system to try
to meld these roles instead of playing out the logical implications of one or
the other?

156. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) (describing dispute resolution as "one consequence of the judicial decision," but insisting that "the function of the judge-a statement of social purpose and a definition of
role-is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values"). A possible
implication of this law-declaration model, which Fiss explicitly draws, is that settlement and arbitration should be discouraged. From the standpoint of economics, one might further argue that law is a
public good whose value is eroded by private dispute resolution. For a trenchant critique of this
argument, see Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209, 243-47 (2000).
157. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 99, at 496-98; Oldfather, supra note 138, at 139-49. To some
extent, Fuller and Fiss talk past each other, because Fuller's focus is on private-law ordering while
Fiss is concerned primarily with public-law litigation. I do not believe that anything of consequence
in my analysis turns on a distinction between private and public law.
158.

Frost,supra note 99, at 452.

159. Bone, supra note 155, at 1275; see also Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost-Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 221 (1999).

160.

Fiss, supra note 149, at 1089.
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B. Legal Externalities

One plausible reason for not letting parties govern their own affairs, in
life as well as law, is externalities. It makes sense for third parties to intervene when the behavior of first and second parties adversely affects the third
parties. If the manner in which a dispute between A and B is resolved affects
C, one should not be surprised when C shows up at the door asking for a
role in structuring that resolution.
The most direct way in which dispute resolution can affect third parties
is through precedent: if the way that A and B resolve their dispute shapes the
way that C and D must, in the future, resolve theirs, perhaps there are reasons not to let A and B completely control the contours of their dispute.16 '
The third-party effects of precedent seem to be the overwhelming reason
that scholars (or at least scholars who do not fully share Fiss's jurisprudential outlook) have put forward to justify a departure from a strict partycontrolled dispute resolution model. As the irrepressible Amanda Frost puts
it, "In a legal system in which appellate opinions not only establish the
meaning of law, but do so through precedent that binds future litigants,
courts cannot cede to the parties control over legal analysis."
To the contrary, I think that they can indeed cede such control without
dispensing with the practice of precedent, though it might mean reconceiving precedent a bit. Under a relatively modest reconceptualization,
the costs of applying precedent would be somewhat higher than is characteristic of the current system. Under a more fundamental reconceptualization,
the strength and role of precedent would be substantially less than is often
the case under current norms. In either case, the role of precedent turns out
to depend on prior conceptions of the appropriate roles of parties and courts
in determining applicable law. Put simply, the third-party effects of precedent pose a jurisprudential problem for a dispute-resolution model of
adjudication only on a view of precedent that itself is grounded in a
law-declaration model of adjudication. A dispute-resolution approach to
precedent, by contrast, simply does not present the third-party problems that
might lead one to qualify a dispute-resolution model of adjudication. A full
treatment of this issue is far beyond the scope of this Article-and probably
161. Indeed, there may even be due process considerations if litigation between two parties
effectively determines the rights of third parties who are not participants in the dispute. See Amy
Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLo. L. REv. 1011 (2003).
162.

Frost, supra note 99, at 453; see also Cravens, supra note 150, at 255.

163. In previous works, I have strongly questioned the role of precedent in federal constitutional (and statutory) decision making, suggesting that anything beyond a very weak, qualified use
of precedent as a possible source of knowledge about the law is affirmatively unconstitutional. See
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 23 (1994);
Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L.
REv. 1 (2007). My arguments here, however, cover contexts far beyond federal constitutional and
statutory claims, and in those contexts, such as garden-variety common-law decision making, those
arguments have no force or application. Indeed, in unpublished work with Steve Calabresi, I have
vigorously defended a judicious use of precedent in common-law adjudication. So none of my arguments here depends on a suspicion or criticism of precedent per se, even if I am inclined to
indulge such suspicions or criticisms in limited contexts.
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beyond the scope of any article that I am likely ever to write-so my aim
here is only to sketch out some of the relevant considerations and hope that
others better versed in jurisprudence can carry the water further.
It is possible to view precedents as though they are quasi statutes. On
such a model, when a court decides a case, it announces a general principle
of law, which is then applied deductively to a range of subsequent cases that
fall within its compass. The decision that announces the legal principle is
taken as having settled the meaning of the relevant law (whether the law is a
constitutional provision, a statute, or a common law norm does not matter
for this purpose). That is largely how precedents are treated in modem law.
A good percentage of contemporary legal disputes focus almost entirely on
the meaning of judicial decisions on the assumption that once that meaning
is established, the decision of the case at hand will follow as a matter of
course.
Such a practice makes sense on a law-declaration model of adjudication.
If the purpose of courts is to announce principles of law, the clearer and
more sweeping the principles the better, all else being equal. Indeed, settling
legal meaning may be the ultimate normative ground for the courts' lawdeclaration function, at least for some people.64 And to the extent that
precedents serve this legislative-like function of definitively resolving future
cases, the third-party effects are quite evident. The more that precedents
work like statutes, the less sensible it seems to allow parties to control the
issues that courts decide.
This "settlement of the law" view of precedent thus leads directly to the
rule against accepting party stipulations about the law. If those stipulations
were considered binding in future cases, the parties would effectively have
settled not only their own dispute but the future disputes of nonparties as
well. And if they were instead considered binding only on the parties and
court in a particular case but not in future cases, it must be open to future
parties to reexamine those stipulated premises, in which case the precedent
would be of only minimal value to the legal system (though perhaps not
zero value if the stipulated premises were unlikely to be challenged). Accepting party stipulations of fact does not have the same consequences,
because the legal rule can have a settlement function even if it is based on
false assumptions about the case in which it is announced. At a minimum, it
can settle future cases in which those false factual assumptions turn out to
be true. Courts may have other reasons for not accepting factual stipulations,
but promoting the societal-settlement function of adjudication is not among
them.
This quasi-legislative view of precedent, however, is not the only way in
which one might weave precedent into a legal system. Indeed, it is an impoverished way to view precedent in many respects. First, it is far from
obvious that settlement of the law is an affirmative good. The American
164. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1371-76 (1997); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical
Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (2009).
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system of separation of powers and federalism rather plainly assumes, at
least to some extent, that it is not, on the theory that bad settlements can
often be more harmful than leaving the law unsettled.'6 Someone interested
in settlement would not create a system in which different jurisdictions can
have different rules and in which central norms must stem from agreement
among a multiplicity of institutions representing different constituencies.
That is a recipe for cacophony (or, as some would call it, freedom) rather
than settlement. Second, if settlement of the law is the goal, it is hardly obvious that giving precedential effect to judicial decisions is the right way to
accomplish it, particularly in a system with a multilayered judiciary. That is
particularly true when the norms of precedent are fuzzy and the capacity to
control the results of numerous, far-flung judicial actors is necessarily limited. Third, and most pertinent here, this view of precedent undermines the
most important jurisprudential feature of precedent: its role as a source of
otherwise inaccessible, socially dispersed information.
To explore this informational role of precedent, which is inspired (even
if not actually endorsed) by F.A. Hayek,'" would require a separate work.
For now, it will have to suffice to say that precedents can reflect contributions to legal knowledge, just as money prices can reflect contributions to
economic knowledge. But just as one would never make resource-allocation
decisions based on a single price without considering the larger context of
prices in which it is situated, it makes little sense to draw strong conclusions
about law from a single precedent without considering how that precedent
fits into a larger context of other precedents and other sources of knowledge.
On this model, precedent is a process of considering and evaluating decisions made in concrete contexts across an entire legal system, possibly over
a very long period of time. The generality and authoritativeness of a precedent may not appear until a large number of cases have accumulated
reflecting and applying the norm contained in the precedent.
Such a view of precedent does not provide the settlement function afforded by seeing precedents as quasi-legislative enactments. But then a
system of competitive prices does not provide the settlement function afforded by a monopoly. Monopolies have the nontrivial virtue of reducing
price dispersion and its associated search costs. That is not a convincing
argument in favor of monopolies; nor is the diminished settlement value of a
system of informational precedent a convincing argument in favor of treating court decisions as generally binding declarations of law.
Within an informational system of precedent, there is nothing wrong
with accepting party stipulations on both fact and law. Any decision entered
in such a case will be a "precedent" only in an incremental sense and therefore "binding" (or, more precisely, relevant and persuasive) only when those
stipulated foundations are not challenged or altered in subsequent cases.
That is fine on a model of precedent that looks to individual cases not to
165. See Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative (Or "Pucker Up
and Settle This!"), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379 (2003).
166.

See 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,

LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY

(1973).
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establish sweeping norms but rather to make possibly quite modest contributions to a store of legal knowledge that is expected to accumulate and grow
over time.
If that model of precedent seems too thin, it would be possible to have a
stronger doctrine of precedent melded to a party-oriented theory of litigation
that accepts stipulations of law, albeit at some nontrivial cost to the legal
system. One could treat prior decisions as controlling unless the legal conclusions of the precedent court were shaped in some important respect by
party stipulations of law. If stipulations lay behind the precedent, then either
the precedent would be discounted to some degree or those stipulations
would need to be examined to determine if the precedent court's legal conclusions would likely have been different had the correct background law
been applied. The obvious effect of either alternative would be to increase
the costs of invoking precedent. Whether those costs are worth the benefits
of party control of litigation is a question that may be impossible to answer
without a metric for comparing the relevant costs and benefits, which I do
not have.
One should not overstate the differences between the law-declaration
and dispute-resolution models of litigation. A dispute-resolution model of
adjudication would leave plenty of room for law declaration by courts. Anytime that parties disagreed on a legal proposition, the court would have to
make a decision about that proposition, and that decision could well have
system-wide effects. The question is not whether courts should abandon the
enterprise of independent law declaration; the question is whether they
should do so in the limited class of cases in which parties explicitly agree on
certain legal propositions essential to their cases. My limited point here is
that one cannot say "no" based on the external effects of precedent without
begging vital questions about the proper role of precedent in adjudication.
And by the same token, one cannot say "yes" without giving some thought
to the likely implications of that answer for the role of precedent in adjudication.
C. Other Grounds

While the third-party effect of precedent seems to be the leading reason
offered for not ceding to parties full control of the legal contours of their
disputes, it is not the only reason conceivable or that has been advanced.
Indeed, Amanda Frost recently assembled a variety of reasons why, at least
under certain circumstances, she thinks it appropriate for courts to conduct
independent legal analysis in the face of party agreement. To be sure, she
did not focus specifically on situations where the parties have expressly
stipulated to the law, so some of her arguments are not a perfect fit with the
issues raised here. But she did an impressive job of mustering a wide range
of arguments that potentially bear on these issues, and it is worthwhile to
examine them.
167.

See Frost, supra note 99.
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Frost's arguments fall into four main categories, one of which can easily
be expanded to encompass some other important concerns as well. In her
view (and that of others), courts need to maintain control over the law applicable to their cases (1) to preserve their power and duty to say what the law
is, (2) to keep control over their interpretative processes, (3) to maintain
their decisional independence, and (4) to safeguard both their own judicial
powers and the legislative powers of lawmaking bodies. Alone or in combination, these arguments are not decisive against a party-centered approach
to adjudication and its accompanying sympathy for legal stipulations.
1. Law Declaration

One of the most famous lines in American law is the statement in
Marbury v. Madison that it is "the province and duty of the [courts] to say
what the law is."'6 In the context of the case, the statement makes perfect
sense. Congress and the president had previously determined, at least implicitly, that it was constitutional to vest the Supreme Court with original
jurisdiction in mandamus cases such as William Marbury's claim for his
commission.'69 The question for the Court was whether those prior determinations were conclusively binding on courts or whether the Court could
make its own judgment, independently of the other national departments, on
the meaning of the applicable law. Marbury said, quite sensibly, that federal
courts are not so bound because their "judicial Power" to decide cases includes, as a necessary component, the power and duty to determine the
applicable law. Accordingly, the Court was free to decide for itself whether
the statute or the Constitution, assuming a conflict between the two, was the
paramount governing law.
Nothing in that discussion speaks to legal stipulations when jurisdiction
is not at stake. If the only parties to the case were Congress and the president and both agreed on the relevant legal propositions, then Marbury would
have raised the question whether the courts could or should interject a different view of the law. But that is not what happened in Marbury. Moreover,
the issue addressed by the Court in Marbury was jurisdictional: if the Court
truly had no power to hear the case, then it needed simply to establish that
fact and say no more. Even if all of the parties wanted the Court to decide
the case on the merits, if the Court truly believed that it had no jurisdiction,
then that is the one context in which party stipulations of law should not be
accepted even under a party-centered adjudicative model.
Marbury today is often taken to stand for very different claims, including at the extreme the claim that legal pronouncements by federal courts are
hierarchically superior to, rather than (as Marbury actually decided) coordi168.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

169. In fact, it is questionable whether any such determination was made, even implicitly, as it
is doubtful whether the Judiciary Act of 1789 actually purported to create such original jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court. For a brief account of the scholarly debate over Chief Justice Marshall's
interpretation of section 13 of the Judiciary Act in Marbury,see Edward A. Hartnett, Not the King's
Bench, 20 CONsT. COMMENT. 283, 286-90 (2003). I take the Court's decision at face value here.
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nate with, the legal views of other federal officials, state officials, or private
citizens.o This vision of judicial supremacy has no foundation in the Constitution or the decision in Marbury (though some have tried, unsuccessfully
in my view, to ground it in foundational principles of jurisprudence ..).
Marbury grounded the judicial power and obligation to state the law-a
power nowhere expressly granted by the Constitution-in the more basic
power to decide cases."2
Once one takes a sweepingly broad view of judicial power, it is not difficult to find in that "power" an active role for judges in determining law
even in the face of party agreement. Frost takes that leap, moving from (1)
Marbury to (2) the claim that "[l]ocating the answer to disputed questions of
law is one of the federal judiciary's essential functions""' to (3) the conclusion that "[w]hen the parties fail to fully and accurately describe applicable
legal standards, the norm against judicial issue creation comes into conflict
with the judiciary's law pronouncement power."7 4 But all of this begs the
question whether the federal judiciary in fact has a "law pronouncement
power," separate and apart from its case-deciding power, as an "essential
function." It is certainly possible to hold and defend that view; I daresay it is
by far the majority view among members of the American legal community.
Such a view, however, requires independent support from some other argument besides itself.75
Frost states her position as follows:
If litigants could constrain courts through their own truncated or inaccurate
depictions of the meaning of statutes, constitutional provisions, and the
like, they could effectively wrest this task away from the courts, putting

170. The poster child for this position is Cooper v. Aamn, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), with its bald
declaration that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,"
id. at 18, and that Supreme Court decisions are therefore "the supreme law of the land," id. Frost
appears to accept that judicial supremacist position. See Frost, supra note 99, at 472 (saying that,
until they are overridden by statutes or constitutional amendments, "judicial pronouncements are the
law for all the citizens to follow").
171.

See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 164.

172. For a correct account of Marbury, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The IrrepressibleMyth of
Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2706 (2003).
173.

Frost, supra note 99, at 471.

174.

Id. at 472.

175. Professor Pushaw has argued that law declaration was an expected function of federal
courts, especially in federal question, admiralty, and foreign dignitary cases. Pushaw, Jr., supra note
64, at 476-83. But while this may establish that there should be different justiciability requirements
for different classes of disputes in federal courts, it does not speak to whether courts may or should
disregard party agreement on questions of law. Law declaration is absolutely a crucial aspect of the
judicial function whenever the parties disagree about the applicable law. That does not make courts
law declarers first and dispute resolvers second, nor does it say to prefer the first role over the second in the event of conflict. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding
the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 149 n.278.
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federal judges in the impoverished role of picking and choosing from
among the litigants' interpretations of the law, rather than their own.
Take away the word "impoverished," and I would say "right on!" If one believes that litigation is about courts choosing among the arguments and
proofs presented by parties rather than objectively determining the right answers, then that is precisely what courts should do. Frost has elegantly
described the (widely held) view that courts should control the law-finding
process in litigation, but she has not actually argued for it in anything other
than a question-begging fashion.
2. InterpretativeMethod

One of the most important legal questions at issue in every case is how
legal questions should be decided. In order to defend a proposition of law,
one must have some interpretative methodology that prescribes how legal
propositions are properly defended. Oftentimes, choosing the appropriate
methodology is the decisive legal issue in a case. Accordingly, the power
and duty to select and apply interpretative methodologies when needed for
the disposition of a case is as much an implied component of the judicial
power as is the power and duty to establish the law.
What if the parties stipulate to the appropriate interpretative methodology in a case? Can the parties agree, for instance, that their statutory dispute
will be resolved solely on the basis of plain meaning-perhaps to avoid the
mutual costs of exhaustively canvassing the legislative history, just as parties
can sometimes stipulate to facts to avoid the mutual costs of determining the
truth? Would a court in such a case be bound to accept the parties' agreedupon methodology?
On a party-centered view of adjudication, it is hard to see why not.
Agreeing on legal methodology is no different in principle from agreeing on
the meaning of a statute or the bindingness of a precedent. And indeed,
Frost's principal argument against letting parties control methodology
through stipulation is the same as her argument against letting parties directly determine substantive law: it would "let litigants control an essential
aspect of the judicial function." 77 Again, this argument simply begs the
question. It is entirely persuasive for anyone who already believes in a lawdeclaration model of courts, but it provides only self-referential reasons for
holding that belief in the first place. 7 1
176. Frost, supra note 99, at 472. Frost goes on to say that deciding cases based on the parties'
arguments and proofs "would transform the federal courts from the third branch of government
responsible for declaring the meaning of law into a private arbitration service working for the parties
and no one else." Id. at 474.
177.

Id. at 479.

178. Does this mean that on a party-centered approach, the parties could stipulate to any
dispute-resolving methodology, including coin flips (or duels), and courts must apply them? My
libertarian streak screams to say "yes," but I am not sure that that is correct. At least at the federal
level, courts exercise the "judicial Power of the United States." It may be that the term "judicial
Power" limits the range of actions that courts can take; a court that flips a coin, even on the stipula-
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Frost does, however, add a twist that can easily be extended into a
broader argument against party control of legal methodology. She points out
that certain methodological principles are employed by courts to protect
system-wide values, which specific parties may have no interest in promoting in any particular case. As an example, she invokes the avoidance
doctrine, which counsels courts to (mis?)construe ambiguous statutes to
render them, as much as possible, in accordance with rather than contrary to
the Constitution.m"9 In Free Enterprise Fund, Justice Breyer pointed out that
by assuming that SEC commissioners are removable only for cause without
examining the statutory basis for that claim, the Court traded what could
have been a decision on statutory grounds for a decision on constitutional
grounds, in apparent disregard of at least one variant of the avoidance
canon. 1o Numerous other canons of construction also have substantive aims,
such as preserving federalism or protecting the public fisc."' Litigants may
have no interest in serving those values if they get in the way of a decision
that both litigants want. As Frost correctly points out,"8 deciding cases as
the parties want them decided can often result in broader assertions of judicial power than courts would prefer to exercise if they could choose the
terms of decision for themselves.
Framed in this way, the argument is an extension of the previous argument from externalities. Precedent is the most obvious third-party effect of
judicial decisions, but perhaps substantive canons reflect other potential system-wide effects that are supposed to affect individual cases but will not
necessarily enter into the calculus of litigating (and stipulating) parties. And
once one focuses on those effects, others can readily come to mind. The
parties will not always choose to focus on issues that are easiest for courts to
decide. Stipulations, either of law or fact, can make the courts' work more
difficult rather than easier if they trade agreement on relatively straightforward issues for disagreement on relatively complex ones. Because courts are
publicly funded, litigants do not bear the full costs of their use of the court
system, so perhaps there are institutional reasons for refusing to yield complete control over the legal process to parties.
To my mind, this is the strongest argument against full party control of
litigation through legal stipulations. Note that unlike the argument from
precedent, it is also an argument against full party control of litigation
through factual stipulations, which have the same potential to increase costs
tion of the parties, may not be exercising "judicial Power." Thus, the right answer may be that parties can choose among the range of decision-making methodologies that are within the compass of
the constitutional power of courts. State courts may similarly be limited by their own constitutions.
179.

Frost, supra note 99, at 479.

180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Avoidance can involve construing statutes to avoid constitutional issues and
choosing to decide statutory questions before addressing constitutional issues.
181. For an enlightening discussion of substantive canons and the difficulties of defending
many of them, see Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REv.
109 (2010).
182.

Frost, supra note 99, at 481-82.
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to courts and to direct decisions in ways that benefit the parties but not the
system as a whole. But the appropriate solution to the undoubted problem of
externalities is not necessarily to take away party control, just as the
appropriate solution to economic externalities is not necessarily to abolish
property. Even if one thinks that the costs (however measured) of those
externalities exceed the benefits (however measured) of party control of
litigation, perhaps those externalities could instead be internalized. For
example, if party stipulations increase rather than decrease the costs to the
court system, why not simply make parties pay those costs by allowing
courts to charge the parties for such stipulations? The parties can then
decide whether the stipulations are worth the candle.'
With respect to system-wide values embodied in substantive canons,
under a party-centered view of litigation, the precedential effect of any
decision that implicates those values is limited by the underlying agreement
of the parties. Of course, in a system that treats precedents as quasilegislative enactments, it is important to make sure that those precedents
protect values that the parties may not care about very deeply. But any such
system has already abandoned party centrism as a guiding norm.
If the question is whether to make marginal moves towards or away
from party control in a system that tries to accommodate both a disputeresolution and a law-declaration model of courts, Frost has raised critical
considerations that bear on that question. But if one is looking more broadly
at the two models, there is no general "argument from externalities" that
counsels strongly against (or for) a focus on dispute resolution.
3. Judicial Independence

Frost suggests that restricting courts only to those legal matters actually
in dispute would undermine the independence of the judiciary.'8 This claim
is hard to fathom, perhaps because the underlying conception of "independence" is ambiguous. It is true that giving full effect to legal stipulations
allows the parties to manipulate the issues decided by courts. But why is
that a problem, much less a threat to judicial independence? Frost suggests
that it could, in some sense, conscript courts into endorsing legal and policy
positions not reflective of either the actual law or the judges' own views.18 It
is difficult to see how that can be the case if the decision is based on a stipulation. Acceptance of a stipulation is acceptance of party agreement, not an
endorsement of the substance of the stipulation. Of course, if one somehow
equates judicial independence with the very idea of courts as law declarers,
then accepting legal stipulations plainly undermines judicial "independence"
so defined. But that is an odd conception of independence.
183. Coming up with an appropriate fee schedule is not a simple or costless task. But figuring
out under existing law whether to accept party agreement on a legal question, such as the continuing
vitality of existing precedent, is no picnic either. Decisions are never costless.
184.

Frost, supra note 99, at 483.
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In the end, the argument seems to rest on a notion that judicial independence, from all possible controlling influences, is a good thing. That is a

hard position to maintain. To be sure, judicial independence from other governmental actors is a good thing for a wide range of reasons, and certainly
one would want judicial independence from the influence of one party to a
dispute. But when all of the parties agree on the appropriate "influence," it
is hard to see how that is any threat either to courts or to the legal system as
a whole, except on a question-begging understanding of judicial independence.
4. SafeguardingPower

Suppose that Congress enacted a flagrantly unconstitutional law, but all
of the parties chose to accept that law as valid for purposes of their case. If
courts were to accept the parties' stipulation of constitutionality, wouldn't
the courts let Congress exceed its constitutional jurisdiction? Isn't that just
as serious a problem as the courts exceeding their own jurisdiction?l86
On a dispute-resolution model, no, it is not serious at all. Courts do not
exist to police the actions of other governmental actors. Courts exist to decide cases. In the course of deciding cases, courts must determine the
applicable law. If one of the parties-be it the government or a private citizen-thinks that a governmental act, such as a statute, bolsters its case, the
party is free to raise that act as a relevant source of law. If the other party
argues that the statute is in fact unconstitutional and the court agrees, the
statute is given no effect in the particular adjudication. That is it. The court's
decision that the statute is unconstitutional does not delete the statute from
the United States Code or state statute books. The president would not
commit an impeachable offense by attempting to enforce the "invalidated"
law if the president genuinely believed that the court was clearly wrong.1
The statute simply fails to operate if challenged in a particular case. If the
statute is not challenged, so that all parties are willing to accept the law as
valid, there is no deep jurisprudential problem with deciding the case on that
assumption.
To be sure, that may mean that Congress (or the president, or a state, or
a prior court) may, at least for the moment, get away with acting unconstitutionally. So what? It is not the job of courts "to check overstepping by the
political branches."18 " That is the job of voters (or armed revolutionaries).
186.

See id. at 487.

187. To be sure, Frost is correct that "[slcholars generally agree that the executive has to obey
Supreme Court pronouncements about the meaning of the Constitution, even when the executive
disagrees with the Court." Id. at 489. 1 respectfully dissent. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D.
Moore, The Executive Powerof ConstitutionalInterpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267 (1996) (arguing that the president has no obligation to afford even modest deference to Supreme Court opinions,
and that he may, and indeed must, defy even specific judgments the president believes are clearly
mistaken). For an even more extreme dissent than mine, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
DangermusBranch: Executive Powerto Say What the law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217 (1994).
188.

Frost, supra note 99, at 487.
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The job of courts is to decide cases and, where necessary, to determine the
applicable law. Where the applicable law is settled by agreement, it is not
necessary to determine it.
The dispute-resolution and law-declaration models of adjudication are
both coherent models. Each model can spin out implications for the design
of legal institutions and the appropriate rules for litigation. A reasonable
person, and a reasonable judge, could choose either model with a considerable measure of intellectual integrity. The underlying choice is largely
normative, which makes it time for this author, who is no philosopher, to
stop talking about it.
Of course, to spin out coherent polar models of adjudication is not to say
that one must necessarily choose only at the poles. The American legal system obviously pays homage at different points to both models. And there is
no doubt that on a dispute-resolution model, courts will decide issues of law,
and on a law-declaration model (at least one that is not a pure rulemaking
system), courts will decide cases. The problem, however, is that those models point in very different directions on a wide range of issues crucial to the
structure of adjudication. It matters where one puts the emphasis. One can
view courts as deciding matters of law as an incident to their case-deciding
function or one can view them as deciding cases as an incident to their lawdeclaring function. If one puts both functions on an equal footing, then there
must be some means for determining when the one function or the other will
serve as the foundation for a particular practice.
Again, my goal here is not to tell anyone which choice to make, though I
have made no secret of my preference. My goal is to identify the implications and consequences of those approaches. One of the most important
consequences is the extent to which courts should consider themselves
bound by legal stipulations made by parties. The majority opinion in Free
Enterprise Fund chose to accept those stipulations, and it thereby chose to
accept a role as essentially a publicly paid arbitrator. That is a perfectly noble role to serve, to which anyone spared a duel by the existence of the court
system can attest. It is no less noble even though the Court is not remotely
going to accept the full range of consequences that flow from that role. But
it might be nice to see some of those consequences at least acknowledged.
CONCLUSION

The choice between a dispute-resolution and a law-declaration role for
courts has many collateral consequences. The dispute-resolution model calls
for an incremental view of precedent and a broad role for party control of
both the factual and legal issues decided. The law-declaration model calls
for a much more definitive role for precedent and a broader power for courts
to control the terms of their decisions. Framed in this way, the disputeresolution model appears more (for lack of a better word) modest in its
conception of the judicial role than does the law-declaration model. Seen
through this light, the majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, which
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accepted the parties' framing of the legal issues with respect both to the removability of SEC commissioners and to the viability of the Court's prior
precedents on removal of federal officers, was a more (again, for lack of a
better word) restrained opinion than was the dissent. Similarly, the dissenting judges in the D.C. Circuit in Independent InsuranceAgents of America,
Inc. took a more restrained view of the judicial role than did the majority. *
That by itself is neither good nor bad; judicial modesty and restraint are not
necessarily good things, much less constitutionally appropriate things.'9t But
it is (once more for lack of a better word) interesting.
It also has implications for the common practice of nonparties filing
amicus briefs to raise issues not addressed by the parties.' 9' In Free Enterprise Fund, for example, one brief filed by some legal scholars (including
the present author) asked the Court to overturn Morrison v. Olson and hold
that the president has constitutionally unlimited power to remove executive
officials.192 The same brief urged the Court to hold that members of the
PCAOB were constitutional "Heads of Departments" under the Appointments Clause and therefore principal officers who must be appointed by the
president and Senate. The Court specifically declined to reconsider Morrison, and it did not even mention the possibility that the PCAOB might be a
constitutional "Department[]" whose heads are principal officers.
On a dispute-resolution model of adjudication, it is unclear how to handle such situations. At one level, it seems like the majority took the right
approach. If the parties did not want those issues raised, there is no reason
why the Court should have raised them. But it is not obvious that all of the
parties did not want those issues raised. In Free Enterprise Fund, the petitioners were delighted to have arguments on the table calling for the
overruling of Morrison and for holding the PCAOB to be a constitutional
"Department[]"--even though the latter argument actually contradicted a
position in the petitioners' principal brief. That will often be the caseparties will sometimes deliberately choose not to advance issues only because they know that amici will do the work for them. In that respect,
amicus briefs can essentially amount to end runs around length limits on
briefs imposed by courts. So understood, they pose a problem of judicial
management but no problem of jurisprudence. If, however, there is good
reason to think that all of the parties want certain issues raised by amici to
be off the table, a party-centered view of litigation would counsel strongly
against giving any credence to amicus briefs that go beyond the limits set by
the parties. On a law-declaration model, amicus briefs should always be

189. The majority included, by the way, such conservative stalwarts as David Sentelle, Jim
Buckley, and Karen Henderson.
190.
(2002).

See Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?, I GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81

191.
For a much more detailed and thoughtful account than I provide here of this practice and
its implications, see Cravens, supra note 150, at 274-82.
192.

Brief of Law Professors, supra note 45.
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welcome, subject only to administrative control by the courts to avoid getting swamped by an avalanche of briefs.
Free Enterprise Fund was widely seen as a major case about the structure of the Constitution. Perhaps it should have been viewed instead as a
major case about the structure of adjudication.

